Learning from informal markets: Innovative approaches to land and housing provision; Berner

The migration to the urban areas, particularly in developing countries poses a challenge on international, national and local policy making. In most developing countries the attempts to formalize markets have failed to provide the adequate housing for the ever-growing urban population. Self-help housing and squatting has long been seen as detrimental to sound urban development and planning. In last two decades it has been recognized that self-help housing has a great contribution towards providing a sufficient housing for the urban poor and “it is still the only architecture that works” (Turner, 1976) This form of housing is not only crucial for providing housing for the poor working in the informal sector but it also plays an important role in the urban economy. Without this informal settlements the local economy could not be competitive in the global context.

In the urban context the urban poverty is closely associated with spatial segregation; overcrowding, filth, unemployment, total absence of social services, malnutrition – this representation of poverty is only one-sided and represents only partial reality. To address the issues of urban poverty it is fundamental to recognize that housing needs to meet adequate living standards “as well as cultural definitions of security of tenure as an essential part of a decent standard of living”.  Substandard informal housing has two major issues:1. lack of quality, infrastructure and space and 2. insecurity.

Current policies fail to recognize the importance of providing appropriate land for the housing. Evictions and relocation are justified by governments wanting to beautify and redevelop the cities. These schemes more often than not result in communities repopulation the vacated site. In the case of social housing, the immense expenditures on land and adherence to inappropriate building regulations make the resulting products unaffordable for the urban poor. Since the 70’s slum upgrading and upgrading sites and services are the major approaches to introduce participation and self-help housing into practical policies. It is more efficient to improve the existing settlements that to build new ones, yet the performance and scale of upgrading is disappointing. The upgrades face the inappropriate planning standards and building regulations which increase the public investment and limit the investment to single intervention. In addition the issue of land ownership is a major constrain to redevelopments. The land central to the city is usually to expensive to be populated by the urban poor resulting in relocations. The alternative locations are usually on the periphery, without the adequate transport links to the livelihoods. The prime locations come with the price tag, even the pavement dwellers in India have to pay regular fees to the policemen or syndicates. The informal market plays a significant role in providing housing to the poor. Houses built without permits with a substandard infrastructure and quality, by cutting corners and cost are the only affordable option for the poor. This kind of housing represents an opportunity for the occupant to incrementally improves the home, however the improvements also increase the value of the property which can increase the rent in case of rented properties.

Deficits of formal urban land management and informal responses under rapid urban growth, an international perspective.

Note: This article is specifically about African cities but has interesting observations relevant to Thailand.

The central premise of this article is that informality is a response to poor public policy. In the case of Africa, urban land management was practical to European colonialisation, ‘centered on peripheral ports, with access routes to exploitable resources and later to environments deemed suitable for European settlement’. Because this system was not endogenous, post colonial African cities are ‘exploding cities in unexploding economies’. The residual policies, land use controls, regulations, and high standards have led to a slow pace of development and unaffordable housing.

The author lays out three types of urban land markets:

1. formal/official statutory
2. customary/indigenous, and
3. informal/unauthorized or non-statutory.

On can’t develop a piece of land unless his/her rights on that land are legally specified and protected. However, legalisation of ownership is time consuming, complex, cumbersome and expensive for two reasons: one is that mapping, title registration, surveying, etc. setups are poorly developed and the other is because it is within the interests of some individuals to reinforce the inefficiency of the status-quo. As a result “the ‘informality’ of urban land markets…is as much a commentary on the ineffectiveness of existing official land tenure and regulatory arrangements as it is on their growing irrelevance.”

( I think this is really interesting because it has implications for policy development: if you find informal systems, try to figure out which policy they are responding to!)

The author doesn’t exclude completely the need for public intervention in informal land systems. She says while informal markets are good at provision of low-income housing, one must overcome the externalities of development like: water pollution, sanitation/public health hazards, traffic congestion, encroachment of public/open space, etc. in severely dense and chaotic informal subdivisions. Question: how is this accounted for in the Baan Mankong program?

I don’t want to write an essay here so there are three other interesting things to note:

One is the emergence of SCRs(Substandard Commercial Residential Subdivisions) which are illegal commercial supplies of urban land which imitate formal urban layouts and provide rudimentary services like water, electricity, etc. These SCRs are officially permitted and have financial linkages to urban administration. While they provide low service levels, they are also incrementally phased and built as the income of the residents increases. “As observed in SCRs, developers proceed according to the occupation-building-servicing-planning sequence, a reverse of the formal procedure.”

Another interesting thing is an example from Egypt where another author (Zaghloul) identifies 3 phases of informal settlement growth (he says that slums in the same city of different characteristics are generally closer or further along the same chain of growth): starting, boom, and saturation stages. He says the city can intervene before the boom and provide infrastructure or buy land that will later be used for school, public spaces, or other services.

Finally, a quote which I think is super interesting on the merits and demerits of informal land systems: “Informal urbanization not only poses a major threat for the depletion of agricultural land, but also creates a substandard urban product that is plagued with environmental and social problem. Nevertheless, informal urbanization has exhibited singular merits: it responds to the shelter needs of, what the author calls the forgotten segment of the housing demand; it meets the demand of  expectations and affordability of many segments of the population; operated in a market context and manipulates existing market forces and avoids the market distortions of public subsidies and direct supply. The challenge for public policy, therefore is to transform the informal urbanization product into a decent urban space and to utilize the informal development process to respond to the needs of many segments of the population.”

Don’t know about this for sure but maybe the Baan Mankong urbanization product isn’t under enough scrutiny? There’s a lot going on in this article so it’s worth a read especially if you’re doing your dissertation on Africa. Also… SUPER IMPORTANT is that this article talks about policy in a very spatial way. There is section called “Impact of informal urbanization on the Cairo Urban Region space structure” that blows my mind in that it’s exactly how I have trouble thinking/writing but I feel like it’s the kind of thinking/writing that Camillo is trying to get us to do.

Upgrading Housing Settlements in Developing Countries

This paper has a really basic premise: in development studies, slum upgrading is generally favored over redevelopment (demolishment and rebuilding) because slums are characterized under four assumptions:

1. That low-income settlements are in peripheral locations
2. The settlements have a very mixed land use
3. The settlements are clearly and regularly laid out
4. Individual lot sizes within these settlements are “reasonably” large

The author uses the case of Mumbai (and Dharavi!) to show that these assumptions are not universally true:

1. “As a consequence of physical expansion, many low-income housing settlements, in once peripheral and marginal locations, may now occupy a more strategic and central location in the geography of the city.” (as in Dharavi in relation to the Bandra Kurla complex)
2. “…evidence suggests that it is not atypical for slum-pockets to be largely residential in nature, with slum residents working in service sector jobs in the city”
3. “There is… an inherent contradiction between the last two assumptions. While the observation that low-income housing settlements are regularly laid out indicates the presence of commercial pressure and the involvement of market-based entrepreneurs in land subdivision, the same commercial logic suggests that he idea of large lot-sizes is problematic and unsustainable for low-income groups. Thus, the two assumptions are likely to be contradictory, temporally, ie, over time, as urban land gets scarce and more expensive.

This article is important for two reasons (and by the way, it’s really short and really easy to read so I actually suggest it):

1. It describes the spatial similarities between the case of Baan Mankong and Dharavi
2. It challenges the assumptions about slums that we (generally) have been taught until now

Super interesting.

Causes and effects of evictions in Bangkok

Boonyabancha, Somsook, ‘The Causes and Effects of Slum Eviction in Bangkok’, in Shlomo Angel, Raymon W. Archer, Sidhijai Tanphiphat and Emiel A. Wegelin (Editors), Land for Housing the Poor, Select Publications, Singapore, 1983, pp. 254-283.

“They have become urban refugees in their own city”

This text written by the famous Somsook is very interesting but with very old data from 1981. At that time Somsook was a planner working in the Housing and Human settlements Center of The National Housing Authority.

The text describes all figures related to evictions in Bangkok including how many slums in Bangkok, where they are located, in who’s land and which landowner is more likely to evict and who is more acceptable for negotiation.

The only drawback of the text is its passed age therefore probably or at least we hope that the figures are very different now. I mean, we hope because after the 10 years of CODI works, the situation got better for the urban poor, less evictions are taking place and more negotiation solution are being found between squatters, government and landowners possible by CODI ‘bridge’.

Probably was based on this research that Bangkok starts moving towards a new policy and then finally in 2003 had the creation of CODI.

I will resume some figures from the text to illustrate:

Attention again, figures are from 1981 and they are estimated as some areas had not had a census

-13% of the total population of Bangkok live in 410 slums.

-38% of total slum population have been evicted during the past three years or a currently under threatened of evictions.

In Bangkok evictions are more frequent on government land rather than on private land. This could be explained by the fact that slums on public lands are more centrally located therefore more subject to pressures for redevelopment. The second reason is residents on public land are generally squatter and on private land they normally have a rental agreement with the landlords.

Landonwers

According to the different approaches towards eviction among public land Somsook explains that there is no government police to regularise what should be done and she categorised in three types of behaviour:

Passive – agencies tolerant with slum dwellers generally have no alternative use for the land

Speculative – agencies who want the land for income generation and commercial development.

Utilitarian – agencies who need the land for their own use.

 

The Crown Property Bureau

The Crown Property Bureau is the largest landowner consequently the one that has more slum on their land. They don’t use the land except to create revenue renting the land to other agencies.

The Bureau is a semi-governmental body and is not under any admisnistrative control, it has it owns land policy.

Treasure Department

Treasure Department is not a land user but the agency that manages public land. Generally it has been passive to slum dwellers. If residents are quiet they will be evicted but if they resist the department doesn’t evict.

Monasteries

Each monasteries is a independently legal body so they have all sort of approach to occupation on their land: tolerant or evictions.

Chulalongkorn University and State Railways of Thailand

They have cleared their lands for commercial development.

Private Landowners

Predominately eviction on private land happens when there is change of ownership. Landlords tend to have a close relationship with the residents on their land but the new owner doesn’t.

Location

The analysis identifies four categories related to location that affect evictions: centrality – evictions is highest near the city center

Accessibility – predominance of evictions in the ring betweens one to five kilometres from the city center

land use – evictions in areas adjacent to roads of for the development of roads and expressway

land value – the higher the land value, the greater potential for eviction.

Motif

“Development for profit is the main source of pressure affecting slum eviction in the city”

Different reasons causes evictions. The text identifies the most common ones in order: road construction, commercial developments, residential developments of townhouses, constructions of warehouses or even tennis court.

“development projects do not benefit the country as a whole but only a rich minority, and the fact that they benefit this rich at the expense of large numbers of evicted families is conveniently ignored.” (page 14, Somsook)

The last aspect discussed in the text is the spectrum of evictions threats, there was identified seven levels of threats organised in descending order of seriousness: already evicted, partial demolition, fire or arson, litigation, eviction notices with fixed date, verbal notice with no fixed date, rumours, under negotiation.

Fire is a common way of forcing eviction, in some communities threatened with eviction, they create a patrol group during night to vigil the area and prevent fires attacks.

 Results of evictions

“Eviction is harmful and is a substantial human suffering and financial loss, pushing he people further down the path of misery to worse housing in worse locations” (page 18, Somsook)

The community, generally in the new settlements, have higher house expenditures, higher transportations expenditure, plus the resettlement cost and loss of previous income. People has no idea about the cost of eviction and get attracted by the cash payment offered to compensate, but it is far from sufficient to cover all cost. Housing conditions of evicted families commonly deteriorate.

For the government, the new resettlement itself involves considerable expenditure: new materials, new foundations, new septic tanks, new water and electricity connections…

Resistance to evictions

Resistance on public land has been more successful, where slum dwellers manage to postpone the event or even prevent it. On private land the landlords ”always insure that slum dwellers understand that their stay on the land is temporary and that they may be asked to leave eventually. He do not allow the residents to construct permanent structures on their land.” Sometimes slum dwellers manage to prolong their stay depending on landlords’ behaviours and their goodwill but generally are not successful.

The successful on resistance is closely related to how organise is the community.

The press and some NGO has been “supportive of the people’s appeals and has reported eviction struggles.”

Conclusions

“Eviction is much easier when no one is looking, and much more difficult when a large number of poor families are seen to be thrown out of their home with nowhere to go.” (page 26)

The findings are results of Bangkok Slum Eviction Survey undertaken by Somsook.

(ps. i will attach some tables and the pdf article when I am back in London) – Done, amended on 03rd May 2011

Scaling Up Slums and Squatter Settlements Upgrading in Thailand Leading to Community-Driven Integrated Social Development at City-Wide Level

Boonyabancha, Somsook. Scaling Up Slums and Squatter Settlements Upgrading in Thailand Leading to Community-Driven Integrated Social Development at City-Wide Level, a paper presented at the Arusha Conference, New Frontiers of Social Policy, Arusha, Tanzania, 12-15 December 2005.

(http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRANETSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/Resources/Boonyabanchapaper.rev.1.pdf) Accessed 31 January 2011.

Summary:

Community-driven approach to social development of communities at grassroots level for the improvement of urban slums and squatter settlements. The author talks about the Baan Mankong Program launched by the Thai Government and implemented through CODI. It is a support system for urban poor formed by networks of urban poor communities to develop their own upgrading and land development programs. It acknowledges urban poor people and enhances their rights to the city through dealing with issues of land tenure, ownership and partnering and collaborative projects.

Notes from the text:

Acceptance and recognition of the poor community: “change the relationships between urban poor communities and local governments so these communities become accepted as legitimate parts of the city and have more space and freedom to develop their own responses” (p1).

Upgrading and land development: “The programme is unusual both for its scale and for the way it is structured – with support provided to community-organizations formed by urban poor groups to develop their own comprehensive upgrading and land development programmes” (p2).

Partnerships and collaborations: “the need for all the different community-driven upgrading initiatives to form part of city-wide programmes in which networks of urban poor organizations work in partnership with local governments and other local development actors in city-wide upgrading process and building joint capacity for community-driven development together” (ibid).

The program is partly trying to achieve the goals set by the Millennium Development Goals to make significant improvements to the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers by 2020. Although it recognises that it cannot only be through physical improvements but also requires managerial systems and changes in relationships between residents of informal settlements and the authorities.

Forced evictions: “A commitment to upgrading also means a step away from forced eviction programmes although it does not promise any long-term solution” (p3).

Rights to the city: “a mild form of recognition that these communities were part of the city” (ibid).

“But these initial attempts of upgrading did not know how to deal with these urban poor communities’ status, with their illegality, with their contravention of by-laws and many other aspects. So drains and walkways were provided, as a kind of reluctant, humanitarian gesture, without ever fully accepting that these slums were viable urban settlements” (ibid).

Land security – ownership and tenure: the Kampung improvement programme in Indonesia was the only example whereby the community was fully accepted and provided with secure land tenure in Asia.

Examples of community and civic/NGO movements and partnerships between community-based organisations and community networks and government agencies had been occurring in Thailand since the 1980s. NOTE: this was before the formation of the Millennium Development Goals in 2000.

Boonyabancha describes how UCDO and Rural Development Fund merged to form CODI, please refer to the Community Development Fund in Thailand: A Tool for Poverty Reduction and Affordable Housing abstract as it duplicates the information by the same author.

Community support networks formed according to shared issues such as occupation, pooled savings, co-op housing, land tenure, city, and canals and undertake collaborative communal activities to problem solve.

Merger enabled coverage of both urban and rural communities: “The emphasis on supporting community-managed savings and loan groups and community remains, but it now covers 30,000 rural community organizations as well as the urban community organizations” (p7).

The Thai Government introduced two new programs to address issues of housing for people in the low income band; Baan Mankong (secure housing) Program and the Baan Ua Arthorn (we care) Program in January 2003. Baan Mankong deals with government funds being directly channelled to urban community organisations for issues such as infrastructure, land and housing. In the Baan Ua Arthorn Program the NHA designs, constructs and sells ready-to-occupy flats and houses at reduced rates to low-income households. NOTE: same information as provided in Community Development Fund in Thailand: A Tool for Poverty Reduction and Affordable Housing abstract of the text by the same author.

Collective ownership, management and responsibilities: “Power to decide will be based on communities since community is the owner of the projects as a group. Community will also have to take responsibilities as a group collectively to manage loan for housing construction or land purchase” (p8).

Baan Mankong Program plan:

“2003: upgrading ten pilot communities (1,500 units) and preparations in 20 cities

2004: upgrading 174 slum communities (15,000 units) in 42 cities and preparations in 50 more…

2005-2007: upgrading 285,000 units in 20 cities” (ibid).

Methodology:

• identify stakeholders and explain program
• organise network and community meetings
• establish joint committee to oversee development
• conduct city meeting where joint committees meets representatives from all urban poor communities
• organise survey covering all communities (info  on households, housing security, land ownership, infrastructure problems, community organisations, savings activities and existing development activities)
• from the survey develop a community upgrading plan covering whole city
• support community savings group (while above is happening)
• select pilot projects based on the needs, the communities’ willingness to implement them and learning possibilities
• extend improvement program to other communities
• integrate upgrading initiatives into city-wide development
• build community networks around common land ownership
• create economic space for the poor or economic opportunities
• support constant exchange between projects, cities and regions (p9-10)

How it differs from other upgrading programs:

• urban poor communities and their networks are key actors
• ‘demand-driven’ by communities rather than supply-driven
• The program does not specify standard physical outputs
• It promotes more physical upgrading
• It helps trigger acceptance of low-income communities as legitimate parts of the city
• Secure land tenure is negotiated in each case locally

Six pilot projects:

1. Land purchase and re-blocking: Charoenchai Nimitmai comprising 81 households living on 0.7ha land in Bangkok between an expressway and a drainage canal
2. Post-fire reconstruction and a long-term lease: Bon Kai comprising 566 households living on land owned by the Crown Property Bureau in Klong Toey, central Bangkok
3. Relocation to nearby land: Klong Toey Block 7-12 comprising port workers, daily labourers and small traders residing in squatter settlement housing block on land owned by the Port Authority of Bangkok
4. Scaling up pilot projects: two schemes in the Ramkhamhaeng area of Bangkok; 124-family squatter community on 0.8ha of land and 34 famlies occupying 0.8ha of marshy land both owned by the Crown Property Bureau
5. Land sharing: Klong Lumnoon’s canal-side community
6. The relocation of mini squatters and a long-term lease: Bon Kook community comprising 124 households in the northern Thai city of Uttaradit (p12-14)

Decentralising actions within cities supported: “Community Upgrading is one powerful way to spark off this kind of decentralization and become an active part of city development activities actively participate by communities which will turn out to be active citizen groups of the city” (p15).

Six techniques used in the Baan Mankong Program include pilot projects, learning centres, big events, exchanges and sub-contracting. The program is instigated in other cities through city-wide processes.

Results have “shown that about 60% of families have been facing various kinds of eviction or illegals always become first priorities selected by joint city groups to be pilot projects to start for the city together” (p18).

“Urban poor groups learn by comparing what is being done in another community with what they know well…[when they] begin to understand this together, it is empowering” (p19).

The choice of pilot scheme varies with particular scheme and generally aims to be undertaken by the community for the community: “The communities in different cities choose their pilots according to all sorts of criteria. The important issue here is that the group understands the reasons for choosing the pilot projects” (ibid).

Power relations: “Almost all systems related to power and wealth and key decisions about development in our societies are vertical system. Therefore, the emergence of horizontal platforms or linkages to balance those so many vertical strings are very important” (p21).

“Legal versus illegal, the space between the system of authority and the system of poverty and illegality is a space of tension, fear, uncertainty: evictions and clashes” (p22).

Urban acupuncture: set up of networks of communities exchanging knowledge and experiences in city-wide programs. The pilot projects are a way of setting precedents of successful or not so successful projects and points of learning for communities. Involving local architects in the process is beneficial for the provision of good technical support.

In order for the Baan Mankong Program to be successful it is imperative that:

• The upgrading includes everyone in the community regardless of class, tenure, status
• Land tenure should be collective wherever possible
• There should be collective planning and implementation of the upgrading work
• Housing loans are given to the community organisation not individuals
• Community social welfare systems are built up

Citizenship, empowerment and social upgrading: “When we improve land tenure, in fact, we have improved poor people’s rights and security, we are actually changing their status in the city, their citizenship in the city also undergoes a change, through the upgrading process…Poorer groups have to have confidence in their ability to do things. They need to start believing in their own power, energy and ability – this is social upgrading” (p26).

The community’s “ability to manage funds is the key to freedom to development…upgrading is not something individual upgrading is something that arises from people living together, strengthening each other and wanting to develop, to go forward” (p28).

“Land becomes a collective – NOT INDIVIDUAL! – asset” (p29).

It is important to build community capacity and self-belief as opposed to prescribed solutions that do not allow for learning or growth. The Baan Mankong Program is about ownership, value, self-belief and community.

Actors:

Thai Government, Municipality, Central Government Development Agency, Policy makers, Mayer, CODI, DANCED, NHA, World Bank, UCDO, Rural Development Fund, Universities and Academics (local and international), Community representatives, leaders and networks, Japanese Government, Ministry of Social Development and Human Security, Professionals (architects, young architects, contractors), NGOs, Landowners (public and private), Port Authority of Thailand, Crown Property Bureau (CPB), Bon Kai, Klong Toey Block, Klong Lumnoon, Bon Kook, and Charoenchai Nimitmai communities, Monks

Community Development Fund in Thailand: A Tool for Poverty Reduction and Affordable Housing

Boonyabancha, Somsook for UN-HABITAT. Community Development Fund in Thailand: A Tool for Poverty Reduction and Affordable Housing, Nairobi, 2009.

(http://www.unhabitat.org/pmss/getElectronicVersion.asp?nr=2782&alt=1) Accessed 31 January 2011.

Summary:

The report conveys the emergence of the Community Development Fund in Thailand. It talks about the development of CODI from the merging of two organisations; UCDO (Urban Community Development Office) and the Rural Development Fund in 2000. The relations with various actors in the field and the various types of funding available are highlighted. The case of the Baan Mankong Program is discussed in terms of the types of upgrading programs, how to implement the program, different funding options, how Baan Mankong differs from other upgrading approaches, how it improves people’s assets, and its achievements to date.  The document culminates with the results and impacts of the Community Development Fund generally for communities at large but focuses on the case of Ruam Samakee Reconstruction Project in Bangkok

Notes from the text:

“The Community Development Fund model supports poor communities in organizing savings groups and improves their capacity to manage their fund or the loans for community development activities” (p1).

Background:

In the early 1980’s Thailand was going through transformations due to rapid economic development; the private sector was booming, bank loans and finances were accessible, many construction and infrastructure projects were implemented and the services sector and middle class was growing.

But income share was widening the gap between the rich and the poor; the top 20% had 60% while the bottom 20% only had 3% of the total income. “Poor security of land tenure and the lack of infrastructure resulted in a deteriorating living condition for the urban poor” (p4). Approximately 20% were living in low income settlements in 1990 with 13% facing eviction, 3,500 informal settlements had formed with insecure tenure and poor services, infrastructure and living conditions. They had no legal protection.

The National Housing Authority (NHA) planned relocation of the urban poor was only partially successful as it did not secure livelihood opportunities without which many couldn’t afford to repay the loans/costs of the new homes. Therefore many tended return to the squatter areas.

Urban Community Development Office (UCDO):

The Urban Community Development Office (UCDO) was set up in 1992 by Thai Government to address urban poverty. It was initially under the National Housing Authority (NHA) during its early stages although its administration and development processes remained independent.

UCDO had an initial capital fund of Thai Baht 1250 million (US$ 35.7 million) to provide loans to organised communities for housing, land acquisition and income generation; these were available for community-based savings groups able to manage community finances; the loans would respond to particular needs and have low interest rates (lower than market rates). It was important for the funds to be flexible to the needs of the community.

Communities formed savings and credit groups which UCDO facilitated and “also supported communities in a particular city or province to form networks, to negotiate as a block with city or provincial authorities, or to work together on shared problems of housing, livelihoods, basic services and community enterprise, according to their needs, situation and changing context” (p2). Community networks were formed.

Larger scale community networks led to community-led development and UCDO formed links with other governmental and bilateral agencies. The Danish (Danish Cooperation for Environment and Development) and Japanese Governments, and the World Bank (Social Investment Fund) have funded programs. Welfare funds were established to further support the poorer communities gain access to grants for education and income generation.

The two important elements of the UCDO are institutional development and administrative strategy. The factors that supported the creation of the UCDO were the availability of Government finance, Government Policies, experiences from the past and from other countries, and rural community savings groups. The aim of the program was to “improve living conditions and increase the organizational capacity of urban poor communities through…community’s savings and credit groups and…integrated loans at favorable interest rate” (p7). This would also be promoting communities’ capability to be self-sufficient by drawing out existing skills and knowledge.

By 2000 (8 years of operation): there were 950 community savings groups supporting 53 out of 76 Thai provinces. Although it was becoming clear how limited the activities were under the admin system of the NHA.  So UCDO merged with the Rural Development Fund (which was in a similar position with the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB)) to form Community Organisations Development Institute (CODI) in 2000.

Community Organisations Development Institute (CODI):

Royal Decree enabled CODI to be a new public organisation under the Ministry of Social Development and Human Security thus enabling it to have “its own legal entity to apply to the annual government budget directly” (p3). The merger meant that CODI’s initial capital fund was Thai Baht 2.899 billion (US$ 82.85 million) combining UCDO’s Thai Baht 2.156 million and Rural Development Fund’s Thai Baht 734 million.

In 2003 CODI proposed the Baan Mankong Program to the Thai Government that would “address land and housing problems of low-income sectors which targeted 2000 communities in 200 cities” (p3). The government allowed a budget for the “infrastructure and housing loan interest subsidies” (p3).

“The major lesson is that there is a need to support the poor themselves in becoming important players in the development process. The poor must be involved in decision making processes and in control of the activities that follow” (p3).

Urban Community Development Fund

“The Urban Poor Development Fund (UPDF) was governed by UCDO’s Board of Directors which had full power over all UCDO policies” (p8). This comprised four representatives from the government, four elected community members, and three professionals from NGOs and the private sector. It was important to emphasise the importance of communities as the key drivers of programs and initiatives; to have equal level of influence in decision making.

The UPDF is a revolving fund which allows flexibility in the management of the process by community members. It reduced bureaucratic processes and supported communities directly. It reduced time and was more efficient in supporting the needs of the community while also creating links between the community and other actors in the development process. “Income earned on the fund would cover the administrative and development costs of all activities” (p9).

The types of loans offered comprised revolving funds, income generation, non-project based housing improvements and project based housing. There are four types of project based housing loans; purchasing land of an existing settlement or land, relocation, housing construction on leased or occupying NHA resettlement projects and infrastructure improvement. The conditions for loan applications included having organised savings activities within a community and an accurate and reliable accounting and financial management for at least six months. This meant that the more a community saved, the more it could borrow.

The various roles included UCDO providing technical support, the community networks supporting workshops for learning and capacity building, and the community collecting repayments and managing development processes. There were three parts of obtaining a loan firstly after applying through eligibility the loan has to be approved, the community needs to have collateral and then negotiate the repayment terms.

UCDO/CODI performance

General approach: drawing people together through community savings and loan activities, ground daily activities through financial mechanisms, provide opportunities for the urban poor through savings and loan activities, and create ongoing learning enabling involvement of all members of the community.

Community networks: UCDO needed to find a way to revive capacity of communities to repay loans and transfer this responsibility from individuals to communal level. The process resulted in the creation of community networks to “work and share responsibilities in the form of a network” (p16) with linkages through district, city or national scale or sector based. These connections enabled communities to deal with issues such as housing, infrastructure, land, education, health and planning. The community networks share “common rules, norms, and simple coordinating structure and taskforce bases on various activities that are planned and agreed together” (ibid). The community networks enabled a platform for communities to learn from each other’s experiences and strengthen community relations.

The community networks and linkages with existing development agencies and other actors assisted in forming the Local Development Committee in each city. Other organisations encouraged to form links with included local authorities, NGOs, professionals, federations, and the government. In urban areas these groups were called the Urban Community Development Committees. Development activities were subcontracted to municipalities and NGOs. NGOs, community networks and local authorities were given direct financial support to undertake development projects.

The Baan Mankong Program

The Thai Government introduced two new programs to address issues of housing for people in the low income band; Baan Mankong (secure housing) Program and the Baan Ua Arthorn (we care) Program in January 2003. Baan Mankong deals with government funds being directly channelled to urban community organisations for issues such as infrastructure, land and housing. In the Baan Ua Arthorn Program the NHA designs, constructs and sells ready-to-occupy flats and houses at reduced rates to low-income households.

“The Baan Mankong Program was specifically set up to support upgrading processes that are designed and managed by existing low-income communities and networks” (p19) that work with universities, professionals and local authorities to implement upgrading initiatives. The Program has a target of “improving the housing, living conditions and tenure security of about 200,000 poor households, in 2000 poor communities in 200 cities, within five years” (ibid, as of 2009) and is a demand-driven approach.

The Baan Mankong Program is implemented in the following stages:

1. Identifying relevant stakeholders and explaining the program
2. Organising community meetings for stakeholders to take ownership of the program
3. Establishing joint committees to manage the implementation process
4. Creating joint mechanisms to collectively plan and implement housing development
5. Gathering information
6. Creating an improvement plan
7. Establishing collective community savings and loans groups
8. Selecting and assigning pilot projects
9. Developing plans for launching the program

The types of Baan Mankong Upgrading Program are:

• On-site Upgrading (improvements to settlements without changing layouts and plot sizes)
• On-site Reblocking (infrastructural improvements and lay-out of housing in existing settlements)
• On-site Reconstruction (existing settlements completely demolished and rebuilt on the same land through a long-term lease or community ownership)
• Land sharing (both landowners and communities share land, e.g. Ruam Samakee, Tung Wah and Klong Lumnoon)
• Relocation

There are three main types of funding available through the program:

1. Government subsidies (housing, administrative and capacity building subsidies)
2. Long-term loans for housing development
3. Household savings

How is it different from conventional upgrading approaches?

• Allows urban poor communities and networks to be the main actors (control funding, manage projects, implement improvements, and undertake building activities)
• It is community demand-driven with priority given to communities ready to execute their own improvements
• Variety of solutions to fit the particular needs of communities
• Allows flexibility for communities to coordinate with local partners and agencies
• CODI acts as facilitator
• It enables the changes to community social structures
• Helps to trigger acceptance of the low-income communities once changes have been implemented
• Secure land tenure negotiated for most communities by individuals with emphasis on collective rather than individual land tenure

So far 1,250 community initiatives are in operation, 76,792 households have been improved and the program is working in 237 cities in Thailand.

Interesting quotes:

“As a result of settlement upgrading, the issue of land tenure has been resolved, shacks and makeshifts are replaced by permanent housing and necessary utilities and basic services are put in place” (p24).

“Secure land tenure is essential in allowing this development to happen and opens up the gate for additional energy, development resources and investment to flow into these communities” (ibid).

“Property rights bring with them a sense of legitimacy, infrastructure improvements, while creating a much-needed capital, and the participation of the poor” (p25).

Conclusion

The general impacts on UPCD:

• Increase in community organisation and networks
• Increase in community assets and direct financial resources
• Increased community management and entrepreneurship skills
• Development of more diverse housing solutions from individual projects to city processes
• Development of large scale community welfare activities
• Communities have stronger status and can develop better partnerships with local authorities and other development actors
• Changing the way how development institutions are managed

Case Study: Ruam Samakee Community

Squatter community comprising 124 families on 0.89ha of swamp land in the Ramkhamhaeng Soi 39 in Bangkok owned by the Crown Property Bureau (CPB). The community comprised of migrants from north-eastern Thailand such as vendors in unregulated factories and labourers from the Ramkhamhaeng business area.

CPB initially wanted to lease the land to a private developer with the permission to evict the occupants. However the Ruam Samakee Community organised themselves into savings groups and set up a welfare program and through lengthy negotiation processes managed to obtain a long-term lease of the land, returning 0.16ha of land and rebuilding houses on the remaining 0.73ha plot on a collective long-term lease.

After the initiation of the Baan Mankong Program, the Ruam Samakee Community was selected as one of the pilot projects. Two young architects from the Community Organisation Development Office “began working with the people to help develop a new layout plan, with three lines of row-houses arranged along two lanes, a small community center and a playground” (p28).

The upgrading program comprised creation of new housing (detached-twin houses, row houses and flats for rent), land and tenure status, management of housing construction costs, creation of housing standards, provision of basic services and enabling the housing to be affordable. By 2008 all 124 units had been constructed, with a raised level of land to prevent flooding and new infrastructure. These pilot projects influenced the initiation of development projects of seven other informal settlements on CPB land in the area.

The financial sustainability of the program can be observed through three indicators; community savings activity, community investment in their housing and social contract binding the community together.

Actors:

CODI (Community Organisations Development Institute), Rural Development Fund, UCDO (Urban Community Development Office), Crown Property Bureau (CPB), DANCED (Danish Cooperation for Environment and Development), the Duang Prateep Foundation, Human Development Center, Human Settlement Federation, NESDB (National Economic and Social Development Board), NHA (National Housing Authority), POFD (People’s Organisation for Development), UNESCAP (United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific), Urban Community Development Committees, Thai Government, Municipalities, Local Authorities, NGOs, Federations, Professionals, Savings Groups, Community Networks, Local Academics/Universities, Ruam Samakee Community

City-Wide Upgrading in: Bangkok

Asian Coalition for Housing Rights. ‘City-Wide Upgrading in: Bangkok’, in Baan Mankong Cities, October 2005. (http://www.achr.net/Countries/Thailand/Ban%20Mankong/Baan%20Mankong%20Cities%20Part%202.pdf)

Abstract:

There are 1604 informal settlements across Bangkok and in order to make the upgrading more manageable; each district (50 in total) has been regarded as a city for the Baan Mankong Programme. Each district conducts its own survey of poor settlements, forms its own committees and develops own 3-year upgrading plan. Two pilot projects selected from each district, a total of 100 in Bangkok. The idea is to “break the wall” of savings group which limit access and do not reach many poor communities.

On April 3 2004 a big seminar was held to discuss the Baan Mankong Programme with 1500 participants invited to share their experiences, learn, express problems and plan collectively to solve the housing problems. 64 communities targeted for solving their housing problems. Canal Networks and Housing Cooperative Network were created for communities to support other communities with similar needs, hence creating support networks.

Canal Networks comprise communities living in informal settlements along the many canals in Bangkok. Networks may develop according to certain canals or canal communities within certain districts. Activities include cleaning canals and their environments, savings and welfare activities. Some are beginning collaborative pilot programmes with NGOs, local universities and district officials with the aim to improve all canal side settlements.

Housing Cooperative Network were introduced by CODI before the Baan Mankong programme for a support network of communities facing eviction to collectively purchase alternative land and develop their own housing projects. These are experienced communities who often help other communities to form cooperatives, start savings groups, search for land, negotiate land purchase/lease terms and design plot layouts and housing. After-housing activities comprise daily savings and loan repayment, community welfare, income generation and environmental improvements.

4 pilot upgrading projects briefly identified; Chalermchai Nimitmai, Bonkai, Klong Toey Block 7-12, and Klong Lumnoon communities. Brief outline of the communities and their struggles are identified alongside figures for the number of households, tenure terms, landowner, upgrading type, infrastructure costs, housing loans, land loan and land area. The article also includes before and after pictures of the upgrading programmes for these communities.

The document also includes a case study and city-wide upgrading of Rangsit a municipality in the Pathum Thani Province; it is part of the greater Bangkok Metropolitan Region. Thailand’s first planned agricultural development was in Rangsit which unfortunately due to Bangkok’s expansion and high real estate value of land the eviction of many of the Province’s canal-side communities began in the 60’s and 70’s.

This article goes into some detail regarding one of the many canal-side communities, Mit Sampan which was the first pilot upgrading project. It conveys the story of how a fire broke out creating devastating damage to 84 houses. The landowner who wanted to develop the land for commercial use refused to help rebuild the homes. The affected households formed a committee, created a savings group and sought an alternative land. With the help of Rangsit’s mayor, the same landowner dropped the selling price of another 1.4 hectares of open land not too far away from the settlement which the community group bought with the help of a loan from CODI.

The resettlement project was a success and there are now 8 further upgrading projects underway in Rangsit of squatter settlements, many of them canal-side communities. The article as it did for the Bangkok pilot project provides figures for the Mit Sampan’s upgrading finances. Images document how the community was involved and participatory methods used; models of proposed house designs, community discussions and consultations.

NOTE: One group will be going to a site in Pathum Thani Province in Rangsit during the fieldtrip.

Actors:

ACHR, Chalermchai Nimitmai, Bonkai, Klong Toey and Klong Lumnoon communities, Port Authority of Thailand, Crown Property Burea, CODI, Bangkok Metropolitan Authority (BMA), Universities, NGOs, District Government Agencies, National Housing Authority (NHA), Klong Sawaan Community, young Architects

Self-help Housing in Bangkok (2009)

Sheng, Yap Kioe & Koen de Wandeler. ‘Self-Help Housing in Bangkok’, in Habitat International, 2009, pp. 1-10.

A very good article, with current information and objective analysis of the Baan Mankong programme.

• Bangkok Metropolitan Region (BMR) population of 10 million inhabitants.
• Statistical level of urbanisation in Thailand (below Asian average) does not reflect the real situation, as 1) much of urbanisation in Thailand and Bangkok is occurring outside municipal boundaries and the concerned population is counted as rural, 2) there is considerable seasonal/daily migration, 3) many ‘permanent’ migrants maintain their registration in their villages and are administratively not counted as Bangkok residents.
• There are close links between the informal and formal sectors in Bangkok; cheap food, transport and housing provided by the informal sector is a supplier of labour, goods and services to the formal sector.
• Thai culture plays a key part in agreement for housing on private land, both from the landowner and residents perspective.  Society tries to accommodate the poor, at least as long as vested interests are not threatened.
• Thus, informal settlements in Bangkok are somewhat different from those in other cities, as they are scattered all over the city, usually on relatively small plots of land, in between other land uses, aver. size is 200 houses.
• Most settlements in Bangkok meet all 5 criteria that define a slum: insecure residential status, poor structural quality of housing, inadequate access to safe water, sanitation and other infrastructure, and overcrowding (UN-Habitat, 2003)
• Temporary self-built structures are unauthorized from a regulatory perspective
• Due to informal nature of settlement, the authorities are not inclined to provide basic infrastructure (except for electricity)
• Residents make informal arrangements for the supply of water, access to public roads etc.
• Many settlements are  on SRT, PAT, RID land, they are considered squatters as these lands are intended for infrastructure development, maintenance works and emergency access
• Slums often develop on land which is being held for speculation
• Important to note that not all residents of slums are poor, and that some poor live in formal and informal rental housing
• The rental market has happened for the following reasons: 1)Rapid economic development had limited suitable sites for self-builds, 2) Many families lots their savings in the 1997 crash, 3) Many urban poor are temporary or migrant residents, preferring to rent accommodation
• Renters are often the poorest of the poor and the most vulnerable.  Improvement programmes are not always in the best interest of these groups as their rent often increases with improvements. They are sometimes excluded too, as they are seen as a burden to the group (savings clubs etc).

• ….. blah blah blah  lots more about government interventions, non-government assistance, the private sector, UCDO and CODI, Baan Mankong, and Effectiveness, Inclusiveness and Sustainability

Conclusions

• Baan Mankong has been effective in improving land tenure security and the housing conditions of urban poor communities, but there are limitations to it’s effectiveness, inclusiveness and sustainability.
• It’s best suited to those households who need a bit of financial and technical support to gain access to landownership or long-term leases.
• There are urban poor households who cannot afford or do not want to become land and house owners or who need to develop their housing incrementally.
• Also doesn’t catter for the new low-income households in search of housing.
• This emphasises that Thailand urgently needs a national housing policy that sets as its goal adequate housing for all (and in particular the very poor), covering legal, financial, institutional and political means.
• The above is becoming characteristic in newly industrialized cities.
• In the case of Thailand, social welfare policies have not been successful, because society expects people to be self-reliant or to rely on family and the community.
• Slum dwellers do not ask for charity, but insist on their rights.  The provision of access to affordable land and housing addresses the most critical ussue for the urban poor:  Their marginal position in urban society.  What the poor demand is recognition that despite their poverty, they, their jobs and their settlements are integral parts of the city.
• The right to adequate housing for all urban poor through their self-help or otherwise requires structural changes in the distribution of wealth and property.

“We speak louder than before”

Chutapruttikorn, R., 2009. “We speak louder than before”. Zeitschrift für das Bauen in der dritten Welt, Trialog 102/103, 3/4 – 2009, p.64-68.

This is not a full summary but a few notes focusing only on the critical points from the article about Baan Mankong, that Andrew sent additionally:

• Misunderstandings in the design process with the architect, e.g. not enough models or appropriate representation to communicate the design
• Communities have often opted for uniform design of the buildings for a tidy and organized representation of the community but also to speed up the process of building permissions by not having to apply for each building separately. This decision was a majority decision in the community, however this decision-making process didn’t allow variation for minorities who had issues with size and affordability.
• Uniform designs may also help to represent the power of the group
• Misunderstandings about the term “identity”: While variations and distinctiveness is encouraged by CODI, residents don’t necessarily interpret identity the same way. For example a pitched roof was suggested but also represents temporary buildings and is also associated with separation and incompleteness – Thai meaning of environment was not taken in account sufficiently
• Worry about loan burden, savings groups must collect 10% before starting loan program and went to borrow the money from other sources with higher interest rates to take part in the program – proposals to upgrade settlements came from this issue. This does not eradicate the slum image in many squatters minds but is more sustainable for poorest.
• It seems from this article that the sense of higher social status/acceptability, identity and new image associated with the self-made creation of homes and environment cannot be underestimated. The associated change of status influence taste, attitudes and behavior together with the concentration on income to pay off dept may lead to greater individualization. The worth of community values should be encouraged
• Fear of authorities is still haunting settlers and they are still experiencing hindrance from internal and external forces, e.g. official control, regulations, lack of understanding

Setting the Context: Thailand (Harvard Joint Center for Housing International Housing Conference)

The major drivers of economic instability in Thailand have been rapid population growth and rising urbanization. These have created an enormous need for affordable housing. Upper-middle and high income level housing needs have been succesfully satisfied by the private sector but the private sector has avoided attempts to meet the needs of low income people. Policy makers need to work to address the needs of the informal sector.

The NHA was established to provide housing and financial assistance to low and middle-income people, replacing the Government Housing Bank (established to provide housing finance) in 1973. They were involved in the provision of rental accomodations, affordable housing, and slum and squatter housing improvements. Today, many of it’s effort are joint public and private developments.

Case Study: Government Housing Bank – Government Pension Fund

• Launched in 2001 to jump-start crisis-ravaged economy
• Surplus of unsold homes
• Thai government officials and Government Pension Fund members given lower interest loans and lenient income qualification standards to buy homes
• Maximum loan amount 100 per cent of appraised value
• Low initial year monthly payments – graduated mortgage payments
• Huge success – 38,298 loan applicants
• By end of 2004, loans made to 25,311 applicants for new homes
• Program absorbed significant part of housing oversupply and revived the housing
• industry just as the economy began recovering

Government Programs to stimulate demand and supply of housing:

 

1. Ensuring low interest-rate environments
2. Developing a reliable Real Estate Information Center
3. Developing long-term transportation and urban planning strategies
4. Improving Consumer Protection laws for homebuyers
5. Developing an active secondary housing market

Big Housing Challenges, Issues:

1. The big housing challenge is building enough appropriate housing for the low and lower-middle income urban poor in Thailand. Even with zero land costs, developers still find it difficult to built cheap enough housing to meet the needs of the urban poor. Thin margins deter private developers
2. Developing infrastructure and legal mechanisms in slum and squatters settlements to satisfy all parties.
3. Developing an affordable secondary sale market. There are currently no real estate broker or licensing laws to deal with this challenge. As well, income and transaction taxes are too high to stimulate the secondary sale market.

Big Housing Finance Challenges:

1. Lack of infrastructure to deliver low-cost mortgages.
2. Inflexible/outdated financial/legal system

Note: There are a lot of charts to do with housing in the appendix of this article.

Public Welfare Department, Government Housing Bank (est.1953), National Housing Authority (NHA)(est. 1973),