Bringing Non-Governmental Actors into the Policymaking Process, 2006

Shigetomi, Shinichi. ‘Bringing Non-Governmental Actors into the Policymaking Process:
The Case of Local Development Policy in Thailand’, Discussion Paper No. 69 for the
Institute of Developing Economies, August 2006.
(https://ir.ide.go.jp/dspace/bitstream/2344/149/1/ARRIDE_Discussion_No.69_shigetomi.pdf) Accessed
10 January 2010

Paper discribes the process whereby three leading actors (government, local people & NGOs) have interacted to bring about a more participatory system of local development.  It goes through this development in cronological order through the decades and different types of organisations in Thailand.

In the 1980s:

• Opportunities for local people’s participation, although greater than before, were still limited
• They were able to chose from a list of projects provided by the government
• Non-government actors were not accounted as agents of governance

After the 1990s:  – these developments were made possible by changes in the Thai political and economic environment

• NGOs (and other non-gov’t) actors had opportunities to express their views in the process of planning national social and economic policy
• Non-gov’tal actors sought opportunities to express their ideas at provincial level in the policy formation process
• Local people  have been able to gain access to funds that have been available for implementing their own projects

The above transformations were made possible by the capacity of some key actors

• The human and material resources of the gov’t – in it’s ability to help expand the opportunities for participation by non-gov’tal actors
• The local people themselves have created the conditions in which the extra-bureaucratic network has been able to penetrate to the grassroots, without the need to rely on offical local administration
• NGOs provided some important ideas for this system of participatory governance through networking

Bangkok’s Housing Boom and the Financial Crisis in Thailand

This paper is really interesting for the detail it gives about the Financial Crisis in Thailand. I can’t summarize it better than the abstract in the article so I’ll transcribe that. But there’s also a bunch of really great tables and it outlines a lot of private sector actors so I’ll include those too.

Worth a read anyhow.

“This paper explores the causes of the collapse of the housing sector in Bangkok in 197 and its impact on the financial sector and the economy of Thailand. With the liberalization of the Thai economy and its integration into the world economy during the 1980s and 1990s, real estate companies gained access to the US$-nominated off-shore loans at low interest rates. Because of the availability of cheap loans and the speculative demand for housing, financial institutions and real estate developers did not conduct market research and invested in doubtful projects, resulting in an enormous oversupply of housing. The close relationship between bankers, developers and politicians ensured that the government would bail out insolvent real estate companies and financial institutions. In 1996, exports fell and the economy stopped growing due to increased international competition. Unhedged foreign debts reached  dangerous levels and speculative attacks forced the government to devalue the currency. Real estate companies and financial institutions would have  collapsed without the continued bail-outs by the government. However, the government’s non-transparent policies eroded the confidence of the general public and international investors, resulting in capital flight and a serious financial and economic crisis.”

Actors: National Housing Authority, Government Housing Bank, Expats, Securities Exchange Commission, Real Estate Developers (i.e. Bangkok Land, Somprasong Land), Banks (Bangkok Bank, Thai Farmers Bank, Krung Thai Bank, Siam Commercial Bank), Ministry of Finance, Finance companies (General Finance, Nava Finance, Asia Credit, Dhana Siam, Finance One), Credit Fonciers (Thanakorn Credit Foncier, Housing Finance Credit Foncier, Land and House Credit Foncier), Bank of Thailand, Agency for Real Estate Affairs, the Central Valuation Authority, Government Savings Bank, IMF/World Bank, Property Loan Management Organization.

Housing, the state and the market in Thailand: Enabling and enriching the private sector

Yap Kioe Sheng

Journal of Housing and the Built Environment 17: 33-47,2002.

Housing is not viewed as a high priority on the political agenda in Thailand.  The exception being between 1970’s and 1980’s  when NHA built low cost rental apartments.  During this period the government facilitated private sector housing development by allowing them to build at a low cost and intervened to keep interest rates low to encourage more people to buy property.

The lack of integrated housing policies by successive governments produced mixed results in terms of adequate housing for low income groups.  The paper focuses on the Bangkok Metropolitan Region (BMR) as this  is the largest and economically vital area in Thailand.

Bangkok Metropolitan Region is comprised of the Bangkok Metropolitan Area (BMA) and five provinces, Nakhon Pathom, Nonthaburi, Pathum Thani, Samut Prakan and Samut Sakhon.  The population of the area varies due to the overspill from BMA into surrounding provinces which are highly urbanised and rural areas.  Furthermore many of the residents of BMR officially live in other regions as they have not transferred their housing registration to BMK.  From 1980 to 2000 the population growth has been estimated at 3 million, starting at 7 million in 1980 to 10 million in 2000.

There has been a steady increase of housing units in the BMR, from 1980 0.97 million units to 2.65 units by 2000.  The paper describes 3 main stages of housing production in BMR over a 2 decade period.

1 From 1980 to  1985 – Slow growth in housing stock averaging 3% per annum. This equates to an increase of 29,357 units

2 From 1986 to 1996 – Rapid growth in housing stock averaging 10.6% per annum. This equates to an increase of 120,978 units

3 From 1997 to 2000 – Slow growth due to financial crisis in 1997 averaging 2.3% per annum. This equates to an increase of 83,893        units.

There were a total of 1,677,864 by the end of 2000.  The housing stock tripled over the 20 year period and the population grew by 40% for the same period.  This boom mirrored the economy of Thailand which began in 1986 through until 1997.

The figures for housing production do not include that of informal housing sector.  In 1985 1020 slums and squatter settlements were recorded and the estimated population was around 1.2 million.  These figures have remained fairly constant over time unlike the formal sector. It has been said that the increase in low cost housing production is responsible for reducing the number of slum dwellers.

There was an increase in evictions during the period of economic boom as a result of increased land prices and the demand for land, however firm conclusions cannot be drawn as to whether slum dwellers moved into other informal settlements or onto the formal sector. The effect of the financial crisis of 1997 was of increased urban poverty; many people who became unemployed moved into slum areas, however there are no surveys giving concrete figures for this.

The increase in private sector developer- built housing resulted in a decline in the number of self-built housing in the formal and informal sectors.

In comparison to the housing production by private developers, the state produced very little housing (NHA),  it was given that the state was not required to intervene in housing production as sufficient housing was being provided by the private sector.

The National Housing Authority

The Housing Bureau and the Housing Division (Public Welfare Department), the Community Improvement Office and the Government Housing Bank were responsible for housing up until 1973,  during this period there were very limited housing policies in place.  From 1973 following a period of shortage in housing the above state agencies and the development portion of the Government Housing Bank merged to form the National Housing Authority of  Thailand (NHA).

Responsibilites included:-

Building homes for people

Conducting urban community development to clear slums and resettle those affected from clearing process

Providing dwellings and estates for rent, sale and hire-purchase and management of these properties as well as subsidies to tenants and buyers.

1973 saw the end of  a long period of  military dictatorship.  Successive governments were more liberal and  focused on the social welfare of the population.  Although established under the military regime the NHA carried out most of its planning after the rule ended. This was cut short by a military coup in 1976 and saw a period of military-bureaucratic rule until 1987.

NHA – plans

1974-1983 – plan to construct 170,000 housing units, dependant on govt subsidies.  Plan was cancelled in1978 after 36,868 units were built due to the financial burden on the government.

1976 – 1980 – revised plan reduced target units to 120,000, this was also cancelled  due to reliance on state subsidy

1979-1982 – Accelerated plan, replaced the previous and (influenced by World Bank) focused on improvement of 26,000 slum dwellings and development of 14,400 plots in 2 sites- and – service schemes.

1982-1986 – 5 year plan – could not be realised

1984-1986 – 3 year plan replaced the previous.

Each plan failed due to the lack of funding required or through being rejected by the government.  By the mid 80’s all the NHA direct construction plans were abandoned in favour of slum improvement sites-and-services schemes.

Collaboration with private developers started the construction of middle-income housing construction, the profits were to be used to support low-income housing.

3 main problems faced by the NHA

– Ineffectiveness of  its policy of direct construction – units were small and only accomodated 10% of the 1 million slum dwellers. Many disliked the units despite the inner city location and heavily subsidised rents. Many sold their occupancy rights and returned to slums

– Inability to improve slums and squatter areas – many slums and squatter settlements were located on private land and therefore it was impossible for NHA to implement upgrading programmes on this land.

– Difficulty in securing adequate land – complicated anti-corruption state regulations made it a very arduous process and difficult to compete with private sector for land..

The Government Housing Bank

Established in 1953, given status of state enterprise.  Inexperience led to bad loans and a crisis in the early 80’s.

1982 – the bank was reorganised by the Ministry of Finance, although the bank remained a state enterprise it was able to operate on a commercial basis.  The GHB was able to offer reduced interest rates and force commercial banks to lower their home mortgage loans, creating improved housing affordability in the country.  Demand increased, which in turn allowed private sector developers to produce lower-cost housing and an increase in the development of the housing sector.

The Private Sector

6 Periods of Private Sector  housing development

1957 – 1967 – land developers divided and developed vacant plots and then sold onto middle-income families

1967 -1973 – Housing project developers.  Projects became popular due to availabilty of loans and good economy.  3 types of housing developers; land development companies, professional housing developers, building contractors.

1973-1976 – Decline in housing development.  Governement issued Land Subdivision Act to control developers but standards were high and developers were discouraged from taking on projects. Oil crisis further discouraged developers, house prices plummeted

1976-1979 – Housing development projects increased again

1980-1982 – second oil crisis, increase in interest rates saw decline in housing demand and therefore in  development

Mid 1980’s saw an increasing middle class, the demand for housing grew once again. GHB was able to provide loans to homebuyers and private developers to support the demand.

Developers, politicians and bankers

As the ease with which developers could access loans increased, the number of loans increased and the government urged banks to be more selective in giving out loans for housing development.  However many government ministers were closely connected to commercial banks and the real estate sector and relied on them for financial support and so the ministers were not heavily enforcing strict control.

The repayment of the loans was dependent on the properties being sold and so the real estate developers and commercial banks agreed on a package deal to provide low interest loans to customers purchasing one of their own financed properties. Some banks had their own real estate departments and so they were able to control the entire process from build to sale.  Despite government intervening with stricter controls, the banks were able to continue dealings through their own established finance companies which were not as heavily monitored.

Throughout the early 90’s the demand for housing was kept artificially high, many purchases were speculative.  It was not a sign that people were moving out of slums and into formal housing as first thought.

By the middle of the 90’s there was an apparent oversupply of housing.  GHB found 350,000 vacant housing units in BMR many low cost condominiums.  Many developers were unable to sell their units and so defaulted on their loan repayments.

Urban Community Development Office

Economic growth may have seen many people enter the formal housing market but the financial crisis led many into urban poverty.

In 1992 the government  approved the Urban Poor Development Project with a budget of 50million USD.  The NHA issued a regulation for the establishment of the UCDO to implement the project under its jurisdiction.

The UCDO’s objective “is to strengthen, through credit provision, the capacity of slum dwellers and the urban poor to obtain increased and secure income and appropriate housing with secure rights and an improved environment.

1999 the UCDO and the Rural Development Fund merged to form the Community Organisation Development Institute (CODI).

 

Actors: The State, Private sector developers, National Housing Authority (NHA), Government Housing Bank (GHB),  Bangkok International Banking Facility (BIBF), Bangkok Land, The Ministry of Finance, Bank of Thailand, New Aspiration Party (NAP), Financial Institutions Development Fund (FIDF), Urban Committee Development Office (UCDO), , Housing Policy Sub-committee of the National Economic and Social Development Board, Rural Development fund, Community Organisation Development Insitute (CODI)

Key Words: Developers, housing, policy, poverty, public sector, Thailand, finance, government

Bangkok: Global Actor in a Misaligned National Governance Framework (D. Webster & C. Maneepong)

Webster, Douglas & Chuthatip Maneepong. ‘Bangkok’, in City, Vol. 13, No. 1, March 2009, pp. 80-86.

ABSTRACT

The Extended Bangkok Region (EBR) is the capital of Thailand, home to 10 million people in a service-otiented metropolitan area and 8 million in the periurban areas and the site of Southeast Asia most important manufacturing complexes. The capital city status benefited Bangkok with direct employment. Almost 10% of the Gross Metropopitan Product (GMP) of the Bangkok Metropolitan Area (BMA) is derived from official government functions. Also it benefits from firms locating near the national government and important tourists draws. EBR is home of 29% of the nation’s population and is the third largest urban region in Southeast Asia in demographic terms and the largest economy.

Political inestability affects the macroeconomy and incomes of Bangkok’s residents and Thailand’s economy has underperformed competing Southeast Asian and East Asian regions. Inestability is played out in the form of demonstrations and conflicts.

Bangkok’s private sector drives the national economy. The economic performance of the city and its capability to quick adapt, reinventing Thailand’s economy is Bangkok’s prime value to the nation.

Within the city, the area of Rattanakosin plays a formal role as the center of national government of a highly centralized nation where all the key actors (The Monarchy, The Military, The Parliament, The Prime Minister and The Ministry of Interior) are based. Rattanakosin has been the center of power of the Thai State for 240 years and also is the pre-eminent area for contestation of power.

Thai culture is rural centered and Thailand views urbanization cautiously. Rural Thais are the majority of the population (55%) and the culture is officially perceived to be rural-based.

Approximately 800,000 low-wage undocumented workers from Cambodia and Burma and 500,000 high-salary expatriate workers live in the cosmopolitan Bangkok.

There are large net transfers of fiscal revenue from BMA and EBR to Outer Thailand, accelerated of late by populist politics and the decentralization process introduced in 1999. BMA generates 54% of Thailand’s public revenues but receives 30%.

Bangkok’s residents do not have the power to choose national governments, nor do they benefit proportionately from the fiscal revenues that they generate, but they have often removed national governments from power.

BMA has relatively little power to shape the destiny of the metropolis. It controls less than 10% of the investment in public infrastructure in the city.

Bangkok is a middle-class city with higher levels of educational achievement than the remainder of the country. The growing urban middle class in Bangkok is well organized and rallies are a not unfamiliar response by Bangkok residents to what they perceived as unsatisfactory governance.

The world knows, visits, invests in, and talks about, Bangkok because it is fun, has great cuisine, is a cosmopolitan culture and offers world-class services. In addition, rural people percieve Bangkok as a potential migration destination. However, the risk associated with the capital function have caused clear economic damage to the city.

It can be argued that the population contributes to more accountable governance but in the other hand it threats the democracy. The government needs Bangkok as the setting for state power more than Bangkok needs the capital function. One hundred years ago, the opposite was the case.

It is the private sector and consumers that increasingly shape the city, not the national government. Government is constantly trying to catch up with the reality of Bangkok’s global role. Bangkok is now a global city.

ACTORS

BMA, Private Sector

“Mode of Production and Spatial Organization in Thailand: Process and Trends”

Bruneau, Michael. “Mode of Production and Spatial Organization in Thailand: Process and Trends”, in Antipode, Volume 14, Issue 1, April 1982, pp. 1–10.

Summary:
In order to analyse how a society deals with spatial organization this article describes the Asiatic and the capitalist mode of production in Thailand as well as their corresponding state structure and administrative network. Significant levels of organization and power are state and village and intermediate regional structures between these 2. It looks in particular at the capitalist mode of production and how it modifies and combines with the previous forms of production. It also looks at the relevance of the regional division of Thailand and a possible different division based on the irregular penetration of the capitalist mode of production.

Asiatic mode of production:

• One of last forms of classless societies in village communities
• Emergence of aristocracy and society of classes which had power of state and received communities product in work and in kind.
• Concentric areas of authority: the king, the Chao, the Nai (patrons), and their supporters the Phrai and the That
• Spatial organization in a structure of a concentric zonal pattern around the capital with three circles, more and more autonomous towards the perimeter
• Three classes of province (depending on the size of its centre) governed by local dynasties with large degree of autonomy
• Autonomous village communities as smallest administrative unit
• Space was not organized and uniform but had pockets of population with undefined boundaries between them
• Control of people more important than control of space

Capitalist mode of production:

• Emergence of bourgeoisie leads to radical modification in 2^nd half of 19^th century
• Reform policies favored merchant capitalism
• Development of communication network, railways and roads led to centralized administration from Bangkok.
• All forms of slavery abolished 1905
• Work and in kind duties became per capita and land tax
• More rational and uniform administrative system based on british colonial model replaced the concentric zonal system
• Division according to precise hierarchical system from province to village.
• Villages also lost their autonomy and older structures broke up due to integration into commercial/money based network and integration village chiefs into centralized administration and coming with this a class struggle within the villages

While regions have become irrelevant, Thailand can be divided into following areas:

• Urban and peri-urban
• Mining areas
• Amall and medium sized plantations
• Mountain tops and slopes
• Basins plains and accessible rice-cultivating Valleys

Suggestion:
Consider different types of penetration of capitalist mode of production in Thai space with different levels of integration. Regions are currently mostly geographical features.

Spatial data infrastructures for cities in developing countries: Lessons from the Bangkok experience

The cities of the developing world face major problems in managing growth and their urban infrastructure. Geographic information systems and the underlying spatial data infrastructures appear to offer significant potential to assist in managing human settlements in developing countries, however care is required…

The economic, social, institutional, legal and technical environment in the developing world is very different from that in the developed countries. As such the use of GIS and related technologies has had a chequered history in developing countries with many systems being under utilized or lying idle.

By reviewing the environment in developing countries, this paper has attempted to understand and explain the problems and issues in applying spatial information technologies, often taken for granted in the cities of the developed world. The paper reviews the Bangkok Land Information System project as an example to highlight the issues and to suggest some generic strategies.

The main conclusion is that the development of a digital large scale parcel based map as basic spatial infrastructure for a range of GIS business applications is very difficult to achieve for many countries in the short to medium term. The main limitations are a lack of appreciation of what GIS can and cannot do, lack of resources and trained personnel, inefficient bureaucratic processes, lack of data, and lack of hardware and software vendor support. In addition, it is suggested that small to medium scale projects or business based GIS are the best option to introduce the GIS concept to cities, to gain acceptance of the technology. In this regard, high resolution satellite imagery offers an opportunity to obtain the basic spatial data infrastructure or digital map base required to support small to medium scale urban GIS in the future.

Policy Implications of Political Institutionalization and Leadership Changes in Southeast Asia (Guy Pauker)

Pauker, Guy J. Policy Implications of Political Institutionalization and LeadershipChanges in Southeast Asia, Rand Paper, Santa Monica 1985, 23 pages.

ABSTRACT

Among the factors that will shape the future of Southeast Asia, population dynamics are likely to play the most important role. Young people is growing in proportion.

The governments of Southeast Asia seem much more alert in dealing with the early manifestation of ultranationalist, religiously inspired movements.

In an area achieving rapid, spectacular rates of economic growth, social turbulence is unavoidable. This worst-case scenario will not become reality if the governments of Southeast Asia manage their affairs skillfully and wisely in the coming decade and receive adequate outside support. Southeast Asia would become one of the fastest-growing, most prosperous and peaceful regions in the world. It has made an amazing progress since the end of WWII developing human and material resources.

Improved economic conditions are not necessarily a guarantee against social upheaval.

Some countries in Southeast Asia have achieved a degree of political institutionalization that makes at least the near futture predictable while in some others the crystal ball is truly opaque.

Leadership changes in Southeast Asia will be determined by its institutional frame. For instance, Thailand has mantained a considerable stability with popular participation gradually expanded.

Modifications in the “rules of the game” affect interest of various social groups.

There is a need for improvement in the operations of most Southeast Asian governments, pragmatic solutions rather than ideological, competent technocrats rather than radical agitators.

Future leaderships in Southeast Asia will reflect the beliefs, values, and attitudes of the younger generations who did not participate in the struggle for independence. Southeast Asia will have young population for many decades to come but the labor force is growing faster than the labor market.

Southeast Asia has a heartening potential for growing prosperity and peaceful political change if a favourable global economic environment is restored and maintained.

ACTORS

Thailand

Bangkok

Narrative:  William Warren is an American by birth, has lived in Thailand since 1960 where he was a lecturer for more than 30 years at Chulalongkorn University. ‘Bangkok’ is an informal portrait of this most vibrant and perplexing of modern cities. Divided into two parts, the first is a selective history, showing how Bangkok has developed over the last 200 years, while the second explores the contemporary face of the city through a series of personal impressions.

Warren explains how the charms of Bangkok and its people outweigh the disadvantages of pollution, traffic and stifling heat and illicit affairs (sex industry). He also introduces celebrities, such as the early kings of Thailand’s present dynasty and Anna Leonowens, heroine of ‘The King and I’, as well as Jim Thompson, the US-born silk entrepreneur and art collector who mysteriously vanished in the jungles of Malaysia.

Power, Identity and the Rise of Modern Architecture: from Siam to Thailand

Note:  This reading takes a look in part of the dissertation of then Ph.D. candidate Koompong Noobanjong, submitted to the University of Colorado at Denver, 2003.

Abstract:  Modern architecture is a creation of the West.  In a non-western context, it normally reflects a direct intervention of Western powers through colonization.  Thailand, formerly known as Siam, is an exception. Thai people have argued that they adopted and assimilated modern architecture into their unique cultural tradition without being physically colonized.

The shift toward Western culture and modernity is evident in 19^th and 20^th century Thai architecture, particularly in the capitol city of Bangkok.  Major public buildings signify the country’s domestic political circumstances, it’s Westernization and Modernization processes, in addition to the discourse of colonialism and anti-colonialism.  Many of the best-known works resulted in hybrids between European and Siames design characteristics.  They hold more importance than simply stylistic developments, and in essence show a manifestation of social and political awareness as well as notional and cultural identity known as Thainess or ‘khwampenthai’.

Some examples cited in index:

• The Temple of Dawn (Wat Arun) – 17^th century (http://www.into-asia.com/bangkok/attractions/watarun.php) accessed 15/02/2011
• The Temple of the Reclining Buddha (Wat Poh) – 1781 (http://www.into-asia.com/bangkok/attractions/watpho.php) accessed 15/02/2011
• Dusit Palace (Ruan Ton) – 19^th – 20^th century (http://www.hellosiam.com/html/Bangkok/Bangkok%20-%20Vimanmek.htm) accessed 15/02/2011
• The Grand Palace (Praborommaharajawung) – 1782 (http://www.into-asia.com/bangkok/attractions/grandpalace.php) accessed 15/02/2011
• The Temple of the Emerald Buddha (Wat Phra Kaew) – 1782 (http://www.into-asia.com/bangkok/attractions/watphrakaew.php) accessed 15/02/2011

The dissertation examines the evolution of Western and Modern architecture in Siam and Thailand, and illustrates how various architectural ideas have contributed to the physical design and spatial configuration of places associated with negotiation and allocation of political power, which are throne halls, parliaments and government and civic structures since the 1850’s.  Unfortunately, the whole dissertation was not available just abstract and index.

In order to advance multi-cultural and cross-cultural studies, the buildings are investigated for their social, political, economic and cultural signification, considering the issues of cultural borrowing, appropriation and transformation, national and cultural identity, socio-political authority, as well as the native’s resistance and reconciliation to the process of colonization.