Tag Archives: Housing

Learning from informal markets: Innovative approaches to land and housing provision; Berner

6 May

The migration to the urban areas, particularly in developing countries poses a challenge on international, national and local policy making. In most developing countries the attempts to formalize markets have failed to provide the adequate housing for the ever-growing urban population. Self-help housing and squatting has long been seen as detrimental to sound urban development and planning. In last two decades it has been recognized that self-help housing has a great contribution towards providing a sufficient housing for the urban poor and “it is still the only architecture that works” (Turner, 1976) This form of housing is not only crucial for providing housing for the poor working in the informal sector but it also plays an important role in the urban economy. Without this informal settlements the local economy could not be competitive in the global context.

In the urban context the urban poverty is closely associated with spatial segregation; overcrowding, filth, unemployment, total absence of social services, malnutrition – this representation of poverty is only one-sided and represents only partial reality. To address the issues of urban poverty it is fundamental to recognize that housing needs to meet adequate living standards “as well as cultural definitions of security of tenure as an essential part of a decent standard of living”.  Substandard informal housing has two major issues:1. lack of quality, infrastructure and space and 2. insecurity.

Current policies fail to recognize the importance of providing appropriate land for the housing. Evictions and relocation are justified by governments wanting to beautify and redevelop the cities. These schemes more often than not result in communities repopulation the vacated site. In the case of social housing, the immense expenditures on land and adherence to inappropriate building regulations make the resulting products unaffordable for the urban poor. Since the 70’s slum upgrading and upgrading sites and services are the major approaches to introduce participation and self-help housing into practical policies. It is more efficient to improve the existing settlements that to build new ones, yet the performance and scale of upgrading is disappointing. The upgrades face the inappropriate planning standards and building regulations which increase the public investment and limit the investment to single intervention. In addition the issue of land ownership is a major constrain to redevelopments. The land central to the city is usually to expensive to be populated by the urban poor resulting in relocations. The alternative locations are usually on the periphery, without the adequate transport links to the livelihoods. The prime locations come with the price tag, even the pavement dwellers in India have to pay regular fees to the policemen or syndicates. The informal market plays a significant role in providing housing to the poor. Houses built without permits with a substandard infrastructure and quality, by cutting corners and cost are the only affordable option for the poor. This kind of housing represents an opportunity for the occupant to incrementally improves the home, however the improvements also increase the value of the property which can increase the rent in case of rented properties.

Residential Mobility in Private Lower-Cost Housing in Bangkok

1 May

Savasdisara, Tongchai et alli. ‘Residential Mobility in Private Lower-Cost Housing in Bangkok’, in Housing Studies, Vol. 3, No. 4, pp. 250-258.

Summary:

This is essentially a research survey conducted of 13 districts, 20 settlements and 1100 households in Bangkok regarding residential mobility and satisfaction levels in regards to private housing estates in the city; the aim was to balance the existing research on government initiated development (mostly by Western organisations) which essentially analyse the government’s response as opposed to residents’ perspectives. The result of the research study culminated in the creation of a model for low-income countries to explain residential mobility in regards to home ownership and resident satisfaction, in terms of individual dwelling units, estate environment, and the age of the household head.

Notes from the text:

The most influential factors of residents’ satisfaction comprise:

  • Physical and environmental aspects of the neighbourhood (public facilities and infrastructure i.e. playgrounds, parks, roads, sidewalk, streetlights at night, waste disposal and collection)
  • Quality of dwelling units (number and size of rooms, kitchen and toilet, washing areas, natural light and ventilation)
  • Environmental and location (accessibility to work, healthcare, school, shops and markets)
  • Social relations (friends and neighbours) – the most powerful factor

The author refers to residential mobility in terms of moving out from the current housing estate.

  • Background: socio-economic and attributes of residents & physical and environmental characteristics of neighbourhoods
  • Dependent: planning-to-move
  • Intervening: residents’ satisfaction

The primary requirements for moving to new estates are improvements and provision of essential services.

Previous studies on government housing assessed the roles of the Government and the NHA: “Early highly subsidised government housing projects have proved inefficient and expensive for government” (p 251).

The most important reasons for loving out of existing estates were either related to social ties or LAND OWNERSHIP.

Even though previous models for analysing residential mobility were conceptualised in the US, they can still be used as basic guidelines.

Theoretical causes for migration:

  • Lee (1966) – based on the DECISION-MAKING PROCESS; area of origin, area of destination, personal characteristics, intervening obstacles

Conceptual causes for migration:

  • Simon (1957) – based on HUMAN DECISION-MAKING; capacity for formulate and solve problems, acquire and retain information, simplify situation and make a rational decision

Types of stimuli for planning-to-move:

  • Rossi (1955) – relationship between housing and mobility; housing complaints, overcrowding, landlord problems, neighbourhood conditions
  • Leslie and Richardson (1961) – “physical limitations combined with frustrated aspirations” (ibid)

Behavioural theory:

  • Wolpert (1965) – “rational response to a wide range of socio-economic conditions” (ibid); negative and positive evaluations of current and prospective areas affect the decision to move
  • Golant (1971) – three variables identified in Wolpert’s theory: environment, individual and interactions between environment and individuals, “When the stress reaches threshold strength, the individual acts” (p 252)
  • Speare (1974) – set of background variables: friends and relative index, crowding ratio, age of household heads, duration of residence, property ownership, represent desire to move/stay; intervening variable: RESIDENTIAL SATISFACTION
  • Bach and Smith (1977) – elaborated Speare’s model

The districts of the Greater Bangkok area were combined to create the sample area for the survey based the US models. The survey was undertaken between 22 March and 4 May 1986, of household heads who make the most of the decision-making and are family representatives, which meant only weekends were available.

Five factors (also referred to as indices in statistical terms) of housing satisfaction comprise:

  • Location (accessibility to workplace, shops, markets, schools, public transport, telephone services, electricity, water and street lights at night)
  • Dwelling unit (size and number of rooms, kitchen and laundry, bathroom, ventilation and brightness)
  • Environment (noise from neighbours and local area, smoke and odours, cleanliness, roads and walkways, privacy, drainage systems and water supply)
  • Public facilities (security and maintenance of estate, public parking, children’s playgrounds, recreational spaces, fire protection and safety)
  • Neighbours (attitudes in regards to education, economic status and friendliness)

There were a lot of statistical terminologies including various variables, Lambda, Gamma and Pearson’s product moment correlation coefficients. Tables are used to describe the outcomes of the surveys in respect to these ‘coefficients’.

  • Lambda coefficients are nominal measurements of two variables
  • Gamma coefficients are measured ordinally
  • Pearson’s product correlation coefficient measures intervals

The results comprised a casual model represented background variables, residential satisfaction and planning-to-move. These were outlined in three phases:

  • Phase 1 Planning-to-move constraints: exogenous variables; background variables with important links with residential satisfaction and/or planning to move variables
  • Phase 2 Residential satisfaction: intervening variable; impact on personal, household and socio-environmental factors, general residential satisfaction
  • Phase 3 Planning to move: endogenous variable; two-step questions

Path analysis used in the analysis of causality, “to find out whether the background variables have direct planning-to-move or whether they affect planning-to-move indirectly through residential satisfaction” (p 255).

The most likely reason for moving out was home/property/land ownership as opposed to assumptions of residential satisfaction being the most influential factor. “The strongest influences on plans to move house relates to property ownership, followed by residential satisfaction itself… Suwannodom (1982) found land ownership to be a strong determinant” (p 257).

Mobility becomes more difficult with older age; it is easier when people are younger.

Combining the various regions in Thailand would be equivalent to the size of US city analysis using Western models.

Economic necessity is also quite influential in decision-making as it is important to consider the job opportunities with the home-to-work travel times (ibid).

Ultimately, “good designs may reduce discomforts with these issues even though the price of individual houses remains the same” (ibid).

Upgrading Housing Settlements in Developing Countries

30 Apr

This paper has a really basic premise: in development studies, slum upgrading is generally favored over redevelopment (demolishment and rebuilding) because slums are characterized under four assumptions:

  1. That low-income settlements are in peripheral locations
  2. The settlements have a very mixed land use
  3. The settlements are clearly and regularly laid out
  4. Individual lot sizes within these settlements are “reasonably” large
The author uses the case of Mumbai (and Dharavi!) to show that these assumptions are not universally true:
  1. “As a consequence of physical expansion, many low-income housing settlements, in once peripheral and marginal locations, may now occupy a more strategic and central location in the geography of the city.” (as in Dharavi in relation to the Bandra Kurla complex)
  2. “…evidence suggests that it is not atypical for slum-pockets to be largely residential in nature, with slum residents working in service sector jobs in the city”
  3. “There is… an inherent contradiction between the last two assumptions. While the observation that low-income housing settlements are regularly laid out indicates the presence of commercial pressure and the involvement of market-based entrepreneurs in land subdivision, the same commercial logic suggests that he idea of large lot-sizes is problematic and unsustainable for low-income groups. Thus, the two assumptions are likely to be contradictory, temporally, ie, over time, as urban land gets scarce and more expensive.
This article is important for two reasons (and by the way, it’s really short and really easy to read so I actually suggest it):
  1. It describes the spatial similarities between the case of Baan Mankong and Dharavi
  2. It challenges the assumptions about slums that we (generally) have been taught until now
Super interesting.

‘Landlordism in Third World Urban Low-income Settlements: A Case for Further Research’

30 Apr

Kumar, Sunil. ‘Landlordism in Third World Urban Low-income Settlements: A Case for Further Research’, in Urban Studies, Vol. 33, Nos. 4-5, 1996, pp. 753-782.

Low income housing policy focussed on promoting owner-occupation despite the fact that low-income settlements are a mix of owners, landlords and tenants. This is due to perception as owners, focus on ownership to promote self-managed processes of housing production, negative experiences of governments in role of social landlords.

Although majority of households seem to prefer to own rather than rent the central issue is question to what extend ownership is accessible to them: cost/access of land, cost of construction. The article is re-evaluating the bias towards ownership and analyses landlordism in low-income settlements.

Is ownership of land a condition for development of landlordism and therefor linked to strategies of owner-occupiers? If renting is profitable, why are not more households landlords?

1)   Implications for development of landlordism through commodity relationships that have raised the cost of ownership:

  • Criticism of Turner’s analysis of low-income housing process and mostly unchallenged assumptions that households can mange to consolidate their dwellings by themselves is important in relation to development of landlordism: a) The actual move from renting to ownership depends on the supply of land and the commodification of low-income housing (Burgess) and B) its components: Land, Labour, Building materials, Housing finance
  • Land: a) 3 forms of land supply (Baross): non-commercialised (temporary phenomenon), commercialised, administrative = increasingly commodified, b) New patterns: smaller plots and more renter and sharer households (Moser), c) Although access to land is a pre-condition for housing improvement the production process requires consideration of labour materials and finance
  • Labour: a) Unpaid labour serves interest of capital, b) Increase in use of skilled labour for durable quality as investments need to be one-off investments
  • Building materials: a) 60% – 90% of total cost depending on type of labour, b) often not recycled but produced for exchange, c) Security of tenure and building regulations increase commodity relations in building materials through encouragement of investment and force of investment within a certain timespan and causing price increase
  • Housing finance: a) Often focus on finance for land and services, leaving finance of consolidation to individual households, b) Informal sector finance: personal savings or interest-free loans and finance on interest from money-lenders (varying opinions on possibility of savings), c) State self-help housing finance: compulsory mortgage payments for land cost, development charges and building materials and varying debt servicing on loans for maintenance and construction, c) Non-investment after secure tenure was seen as speculation without account of difficulties of repaying loans and competition of expenditure for dwelling consolidation with other consumption. d) Indirect commodification of housing finance in state programs

2)   Need to focus on rental housing markets in low-income settlements and examine the point of view of producer/landlord, not only consumer:

  • Residential mobility reacts to constraints, i.e. changing conditions in the market and household demand, not just behavioural model due to household characteristics: Household income, age of household head, favourable location can determine tenure, price of land vs. level of rent, opportunity for ownership at the periphery, Building materials.
  • “Constraints exert stronger influence than choice”, choice between owning and renting and kind of each
  • Consumers: reasons to remain tenants: difference between migrant poor and urban-born poor, ethnicity and social networks, service levels and their individual access, rent control
  • Producers: Landlords: high ratio tenants to landlords > support for production of rental housing should be provided and visible that more complex than a response to demand.

3)   Theoretical understanding of conditions:

  • Lack of interest due to: image of profit maximisers although a lot operate on small scale, focus not on complete housing units but self-help approach and owner-occupation, impact of rent control on private provision (rent control as indirect intervention of government due to problem of government landlords with rent arrears and maintenance)
  • Rent control: puts cost on landlords either before or as a result, doesn’t ensure enforcement and protection of increase, resulted in very low quality, high up-front payments, discourages the production of new rental housing, brings about a reduction in the return rate on property and therefore deterring investment in the maintenance of stock, can result in change of use
  • Reduction of rental housing also through: availability of land and housing finance, regulations on construction, and use and zoning, security of tenure
  • Fear of rent control might make production of rental housing invisible
  • Factors that influence production of rental housing by individual low-income landlord is different form housing by institutional and commercial landlords, need better understanding why low-income landlords produce housing
  • Small profits, obtain security of investment despite absence of formal legality, often not deliberately purchased for rental purposes
  • Economic returns: renting as result of comparison of other returns of investment, considerations such as purchase for children or sale, allow intermittent injection of capital, investment in rental property through subdivision, subsistence income, short-term renting out. Considerations other than economic return might be more relevant for low-income landlords

4)   Research questions:

  • Nature of low-income landlords?
  • The role of the state?
  • Actions to stimulate the production of rental housing?

Housing Policy Matters: A Global Analysis

28 Apr

Angel, S., 2000. Housing policy matters : a global analysis, Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, p. 418.

Very very VERY interesting book!! It is a MUST read regarding  housing policy, and it partly focus on Bangkok.

[N.B. This book offers information on indicators, measuraments, evaluation strategies regarding success/failure of housing policy implementation. It would be really great if all of you could skim through it; I realize that at this point there’s not time, though, and it’s over 400 pages! Skim through if you can]

Shlomo Angel describes his 30 years of housing story, since he moved from a naive attempt at architectural design of affordable housing to conducting housing research in many countries, to community organiing in slums, to administering a self-help and mutual-aid housing project, to advising governments on housing policy, and to drafting the policy statements of international organizations.

In sum, he argues that “housing has lost its voice…[; it] has simply squandered its voice on defective visions” (p. 3) of modernity such as high-rises, which are weapons of, I dare say, mass-eviction, mass-construction and mass-management in cities entering a postwar period, aiming to reduce the mammoth that is housing-deficit. Since 2000, all this buzz has slowly faded; which makes me question: too big of a task, or too blurry of a vision? Meanwhile, the world population continues growing, people continue with their lives and are housed one way or the other; very few are literally ‘homeless’ as those who cannot attain land and shelter formally (legally?) resort to informal means. Nonetheless they ARE self-housed!

To the author, housing policy matters, but HOW, WHY, WHEN it matters is not quickly and clearly comprehended.

The housing policy environment is the set of government interventions that have a critical and measurable effect on the performance of the housing sector.” (p. 9)

“Housing production is a part of the construction sector, housing investment is a part of the overall capital formation, residential property is a part of the real estate sector, housing finance is a part of the financial sector, housing subsidies are a part of social welfare expenditures, and residential development is a part of urban development” (p. 11)

The housing policy environment consists then of a set of interventions in the housing sector by different government agencies. As expected, not all such interventions sustain a well functioning housing sector. In general terms, some of these interventions are said to be enabling, while others are nonenabling. In this context ‘enabling’ meaning “setting boundaries and giving support while relinquishing control.”

According to Angel (p. 12), ‘enabling’ and ‘nonenabling’ housing policy environments can be distinguished along 5 different lines as:

1. special cases of government intervention in the economy as a whole;

2. systems where housing needs are not by markets and governments oversee markets and correct market failure, versus systems where governments are directly responsible for meeting housing needs;

3. systems governed by the rule law versus systems governed by decree;

4. pluralist versus centralist systems, allowing multiple visions to coexist rather than advancing a single shared vision; or

5. consisting of two different sets of government interventions, each single intervention being enabling or nonenabling in itself.

With this said, a balance of power may be implied in the concept of ‘enabling’ – “a sense that no one actor has a monopoly on the truth or a divine mandate to act outside established rules.” (p. 19)

Moreover, the housing policy environment can be said to be enabling if it attends to the 5 key policy instruments that have an effect on housing performance:

1. adjudication of property rights in land and housing;

2. development and regulation of housing finance institutions;

3. administration of housing subsidies;

4. provision and maintenance of residential infrastructure; and

5. regulation of land and housing development.

For the housing sector to function properly as a whole, all these components need to be enabling. If only the demand side (1, 2, 3) is enabling and the supply side (4, 5) is not, the sector may not gain as much performance as when both sides are balanced.

Differences between the enabling and nonenabling components can be illustrated with the following example:

“In 1990, informal land subdivisions in Bangkok occured within a highly enabling housing policy environment, while high-rise apartment construction in Moscow occured within a highly nonenabling one.

1. the property right regimes: Buyers of a plot in a land subdivision in Bangkok obtained a legal land title, properly registered in the Land Department, which could be sold or mortgaged even though the house they built did not meet building and land subdivision regulations. The tenants obtaining an apartment in Moscow did not yet have a clear legal right to the apartment, could only sell or trade it illegally, and could not move out without losing it.
2. the housing finance regimes: Typically, Bangkok land subdivision residents paid for their plots in installments to a land broker for 18 months, and then mortgaged the plot to any local bank and, using the plot as collateral, paid for it in installments in three and a half years. Houses were constructed gradually, largely without access to mortgage finance. In Moscow, tenants could not pay more of their savings for better housing even if they wished to do so, nor could they obtain a mortgage loan for securing such housing.

3. housing subsidies: Informal land subdivisions in Bangkok were not subsidized. Electricity, water, and building materials were supplied by the land broker at market prices. In Moscow, the entire investment in construction was subsidized. So were rents, as well as the costs of maintenance, energy, and repair without regard to income or need. As a result, the majority of dwellers balked at government efforts to transfer apartments to sitting tenants, even free of charge.

4. residential infrastructure: Informal land subdivisions on the outskirts of Bangkok were served by unpaved secondary roads that connected them to the few arterial highways leading into the city. Right-of-way for these roads was quickly negotiated by village headmen along the edges of land holdings — owners donated the edge of their land in exchange for road access, and those who refused were bypassed. The local authorities obtained the title to the roads and paved them in due time. Land brokers provided water wells, roads on landfill, and electricity lines to the plots, where owners could quickly build start-up houses they could inhabit. All infrastructure was constructed in response to demand. In Moscow, all infrastructure construction, and all other construction for that matter, was Tlie Enabling Approach to Governing Housing 21 coordinated by the Moscow Construction Committee, which, in 1994 for example, employed more than half a million people and had unlimited access to urban land. The committee was charged with the design, finance, execution, and management of all construction in Moscow, implementing its programs without regard to demand.

5. the regulatory regime: In Bangkok, there were very few official restrictions on the shape or form of the house, rarely a difficulty in obtaining the necessary permits, and rarely a fine for not obtaining the necessary permits. People designed and built what they wanted within the constraints of what they could afford, and they never had to wait for anyone. In Moscow, dwellers had to wait for years before obtaining an apartment. They could not participate in any decision on the shape and size of the unit, let alone help in its construction, nor take responsibility for its maintenance regardless of what they could afford: “[I]n 1992 income, whether from the socialist or informal sector, had no influence on housing allocation [I]t was the rationing system rather than households beating
the system that determined how much housing households had.”  (p. 20-21)

Bangkok thus had a more enabling housing policy environment than Moscow in each one of the five components of the housing policy environment.

Housing Indicators as Instruments of Policy: “An enabling housing policy regime requires a system of measurement and
feedback that will make it possible to set limits and provide support to all the actors in the housing sector, while relinquishing control over the actors.” (p. 37)

“States as well as markets in the information age rely on larger and larger sets of numbers, and it becomes imperative for us to understand what these numbers do: how they can be used to illuminate, enlighten, and instruct; and how they can be abused to mystify, misinform, distort, and misrepresent… With or without numbers, policies affecting the housing sector do get formulated, implemented, and evaluated. In the absence of “cool and clean” indicators — solid, carefully updated accounting systems depending on formal reporting requirements, analytical tools, and systematic surveys—the housing sector and its policy environment will be profitably evaluated only by “good journalism” with “hot and dirty” information—qualitative descriptions of chosen aspects of the sector, depending on insightful observations, interviews with street-level informants, and careful story telling.” (p. 39)

Housing Indicatiors and Composite Indices: “In a technical sense, then, a measurement system of indicators for the housing sector has to fulfil the following five requirements:
1. it should be comprehensive and address the main concerns of the key actors in the sector;
2. it should contain useful measures of both cause and effect, indicators and composite indices that characterize the economic, social and political context; the housing policy environment; housing market conditions; and housing market performance;
3. the measures should be both temporal and global, monitoring the sector over time and comparing the sector across cities and countries;
4. the measurement system should be balanced between efficiency and distributive measures, so that judgments can be made; and
5. to be effective, the set of chosen indicators and composite indices should be as small as possible and with as little overlap as possible.
As the components of the measurement system, each individual indicator or composite index should fulfil the following four criteria:

1. it should be unambiguous, clearly indicating “Which way is up?” and making it possible to use it as a means of monitoring whether objectives are being met;
2. it should be simple and precise, sensitive to change, transparent, consistent, and cost-effective;
3. indicators and indices should be insightful inventions, discovered and developed over time to shed light on aspects of the housing sector which would otherwise remain hidden from view; and
4. where a simple ratio is insufficient, composite indices should be constructed in a consistent and transparent manner, assigning self-evident weights to each element of the index.” (p. 47-48)

Channeling Housing Subsidies through, or in Conjunction with, Housing Finance: Governments have often sought to make housing more affordable by mandating forced savings for housing and the issuing of mortgage loans at below-market
interest rates. Such programs, although they have a number of built-in inefficiencies, have been common practice because (a) their administrative costs are lower than those associated with direct housing subsidies, (b) they do not appear in government budgets as direct costs to the government, (c) their basic inefficiency is often not well understood…, and (d) belowmarket mortgage rates often rely on forced savings that do not maintain their value over time.

Tenure: What are the rights of dwellers to the houses they occupy and how protected are those rights? Do dwellers have the right to occupy their homes without the arbitrary threat of eviction? Do they have the right to own houses as private property that can be exchanged at will? Is the right to a minimum dwelling guaranteed by the state? How do these specific bundles of rights affect housing
conditions? To what extent are they protected by existing legislation and enforcement?

The issues surrounding these tenure rights to housing have been central to the housing policy debate. Indeed, from a comprehensive perspective on housing policy, each dwelling unit must be perceived of as a bundle of rights, and housing policy must concern itself with the tenure composition the housing stock — in other words, with ensuring that the bundle of rights associated individual housing units meets societal objectives and expectations. The distribution of bundles of rights to housing is of key importance to society as a whole, because it affects the behavior of people towards their homes, particularly their care and maintenance of their homes and the investment of their savings in home improvements. It also affects the distribution of national wealth and the contribution of wealth-poverty to income-poverty. Finally, the distribution of rights to housing also affects affects the balance of power between the public and the private sector.


Squatter Settlements: Their Sustainability, Architectural Contributions, and Socio-Economic Roles

26 Apr

Pugh, Cedric. ‘Squatter Settlements: Their Sustainability, Architectural Contributions, and Socio-Economic Roles’, in Cities, Vol. 17, No. 5, 2000, pp. 325-337.

Summary:

As suggested by the title Cedric Pugh focuses on the socio-economic roles, sustainability and architectural contributions of squatter settlements. “30-70% of the housing stock in many cities and towns in developing countries… [comprises squatter settlements due to inadequate] housing finance systems and land development…demographic growth and mass poverty” (p 325). The agendas of many aid agencies and governments tend to be to improve sanitary services, health, poverty, and urban environments with the legitimacy of rights to property and occupancy as the root to many over-arching problems. The improvement or rehabilitation processes reveal the importance of social and power relations in changing people’s attitudes at both community and institutional policy levels.

Notes from the text:

Household income is very important for the notion of ‘self-help’: “as household incomes increase self-build recedes and self-help with its relational contracting with builders increases” (ibid). Households tend to improve their homes incrementally “by replacing inferior with superior materials, adding rooms and workshops, and sometimes personalising their outside space” (ibid).

These household improvements tend to be enhanced by upgrading of services infrastructures and tenure. Sustainable improvements will lead to more sustainable communities with high social and economic values and opportunities.

Health problems are a major problem which tends to lead to undernutrition. It affects people’s ability to work and reduces social opportunities; this is ultimately caused by poverty and living conditions.

There is an inadequate housing supply to meet the demand: “squatter settlements house moderate and middle-income groups, as well as the poor and poorest of the poor… [this reflects] mass poverty, underdeveloped housing finance systems, and inadequacies in land policy and land delivery systems” (p 326).

A settlement’s strength and ability to influence is reflected in the nature of its size, structure and internal organisation of the community. Strong leadership and organisation can lead to negotiation with politicians and governing bodies to bring improvements to their settlements.

Improvements may increase the value of land but it also means that it could also increase the social and economic value of the land (although not always). Consequently, it could mean that not all residents may be able to afford to live on land with increased economic value, if it meant increases in rental values.

Two key theorists are important in the discussion of the paper; Abrams and Turner. Abrams “favoured in situ slum improvement and “instalment construction”…[while Turner believed in] humans’ self-fulfilment..and expressing things of value in their lives” (p 326-327).

Turner noticed that incremental improvements to housing were made according to the affordability of households to do so.

The importance of funding and financial assistance for the implementation of development processes can help materialise the concept of self-help in housing and environmental upgrading.

There were two important international conferences to note; the 1992 UN Conference on the Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro and the 1996 Habitat II meeting by UN Centre for Human Settlements (UNCHS) Habitat Agenda in Istanbul. Agenda 21 was the focus of discussions comprising a set of guidelines for sustainable urban development which led to the conception of a new approach – the Environmental Planning and Management (EPM). The EPM envisaged the creation of “new institutions and capacities for urban environmental improvement” (p 327).

The World Bank’s response to the needs of policy changes occurred in three marked eras 1972-82, 1983-93, and Post-1993. During the 1972-82 decade the World Bank adapted Tuner’s theory to formulate policies for slum upgrading with core principles based on replicability, cost recovery and affordability. The following decade, 1983-93, saw the World Bank’s housing policies became more programmatic; it acknowledge institutional reform and widening support to project management as wells urban policies and development programmes, the limiting nature of “geographically delineated projects” and utilising alternative methods of implementing housing programmes (p 327-328).

The Post-1993 era comprised World Bank’s housing policy reform to comprise a seven point programme with a strategic plan to gain from economic returns:

  1. Housing finance systems to be further developed
  2. Backlogs and inadequacies in infrastructure to be given more significance
  3. Land management and land policy reforms to maintain development progress
  4. Regulatory audits recommended to accelerate supplies especially for low-income housing
  5. Competitive efficiency of the construction industry monitored
  6. Targeted subsidies appropriate for the poor
  7. Further attention to internationally loaded reform

The notion of ‘enablement’ is “about the state creating the legal, institutional, economic, financial and social frameworks to enhance economic efficiency and social effectiveness in the development of the housing sector” (p 328).

“An ideal enablement set of principles would bring together technical know-how, a broad participatory approach among residents with wide social inclusion, capability in urban development authorities, and a set of rules whereby each partner would know its responsibilities” (ibid).

A complex process involving a variety of stakeholders encouraged a multidisciplinary approach to development. Collaboration and collective participation was crucial in development processes. Builders, land policies, legal administration systems and housing finance institutions need to collaborate in order to enable pro-poor and egalitarian elements to work. The idea was to review and refresh the Washington Consensus leading to a more holistic policy approach incorporating “cross-sector, society-wide transformations” (p 329).

The requirements of good practice for upgrading squatter settlements should include the value of self-help at both individual and community levels, this value may change according to inflation rates but needs to be regarded with a great deal of importance. It is also important to note that upgrading settlements adds value to the social, economic and health benefits of a community, leading to rehabilitation.

“Rehabilitation is preferred when its standards provide for an extended life…where the existing structure has real value” (p 330).

The characteristics of self-help housing include the value of labour which is considered a saving: “the incremental building and improvement distributes the affordable consumption and saving over time” (ibid). It’s worth noting that informal money lenders tend to be a more flexible and feasible option than private sector financers for the urban poor, often using their savings to fund housing improvements.

McGranahan et al. developed a set of technical-professional forms of evaluations to assess the possible squatter settlement upgrading:

  1. A “broad spectrum survey” which is essentially a socio-economic demographic survey whereby each household would be examined along with their statements for health and environmental problems within their neighbourhoods
  2. A “participatory rapid assessment” which comprises the perceptions of residents and stakeholders in regards to the selection and planning of criteria for improvement targets and how they should be implemented
  3. “contingent valuation analyses” which is basically the value that residents place on issues such as social facilities, upgraded pathways, access roads, sewerage systems, drainage and piped water.

NOTE: is this something we could incorporate in our Bangkok field work?

GIS and digital satellite mappings of fieldwork and surveys is a good way of analysing survey data spatially.

What leads people to improve their homes? What value is placed on the home? “It was the “meaning” residents attached to their feelings that led them to improve design, make plantings, and express the meanings in the interior and external areas” (p 331).

There are a number things that can be done to make a sustainable community: the formation of a neighbourhood group can enable the community to negotiate with local authorities to obtain services to houses, improve their homes through incremental build using own labour at first but then depending on their financial situation contract local builders for long-term security. It ultimately leads to land security and a sense of belonging to a place and community.

Pugh uses the example of two settlements notably San Rafael in the District of San Miguel in Mexico and the Klong Toey settlement in Bangkok. The Klong Toey community organised itself to negotiate for infrastructural improvements. The community “extended self-help from individualised efforts in family housing to collective community self-help in environmental improvements” (p 332). Housing and infrastructural improvements were implemented over a period of time. “Klong Toey…has been community led and improved within the precepts of sustainable development” (ibid).

It is apparent that upgrading squatter settlements have aspects of architectural intuition:

“For Unwin, architecture is about human drive, visions, and interest, and it is mostly about the identification of space” (ibid), a term that relates to “use, occupancy, and meaning of living” (ibid).

“Architecture is also political, revealing beliefs, aspirations, and a view of the world” (ibid).

“Often squatter settlements are localised in relationships to culture, to environmental change, and to the sharing of knowledge about design and construction” (ibid).

An informal shack dwelling is just as architecturally viable as one designed professionally in a civic space. Therefore it becomes clear that “squatter settlement and built form are simultaneously societal, cultural, economic, political, and architectural” (ibid).

Concluding quotes:

“Assisted self-help housing is an important part of overall housing policy in developing countries, but most self-help housing is spontaneous, and not assisted by the state” (p 333).

Change in World Bank policies: “In the context of “learning by doing” the Bank changed its method of provision from geographically delineated projects, first to programmatic approaches mediated through housing finance systems and municipal funds, and subsequently new directions in development policies in 1999” (ibid).

“…in settled squatter areas economic value is added to urban assets and residents add aesthetic and personal expression to their houses and neighbourhoods” (ibid).

Household economics makes a contribution to wider economic activity: “…housing is viewed as the central social and economic asset in the “domestic sector”…in which capital, resources, time and energy are used for things such as housework, cooking, recreation, childrearing, and housing and environmental improvement” (ibid).

“In effect, the domestic, commercial (private), and the public sectors are interdependent and co-ordinate in economic and social development” (ibid).

Self-help “is central in socio-economic, political, environmental and developmental sustainability” (p 334).

A list of seven theoretical guidelines are listed and explained on page 334. “The theoretical guidelines are dependent for their effectiveness on good performances in national and local economies, in progressive social development, in conducive state-market-society relationships, and the leadership and institutional capability” (ibid).

According to Amartya Sen, “poverty is about the deprivation of capability, that development requires the expansion of social opportunity in markets, in state policy, and in households, and that all of this centres upon the freedom of individuals to choose values and lives worth to them” (p 335).

“All of markets, states and households are necessary in socio-economic terms, and the state’s welfare roles extend beyond tax-transfer systems to institutional reform, to social and private property rights, and to qualities of governance” (ibid).

Actors:

Inter-American Development Bank, World Bank, UNCHS, Housing Development Finance Corporation, Local Government, Klong Toey community, Port Authority of Thailand

Bangkok’s Housing Boom and the Financial Crisis in Thailand

26 Apr

This paper is really interesting for the detail it gives about the Financial Crisis in Thailand. I can’t summarize it better than the abstract in the article so I’ll transcribe that. But there’s also a bunch of really great tables and it outlines a lot of private sector actors so I’ll include those too.

Worth a read anyhow.

“This paper explores the causes of the collapse of the housing sector in Bangkok in 197 and its impact on the financial sector and the economy of Thailand. With the liberalization of the Thai economy and its integration into the world economy during the 1980s and 1990s, real estate companies gained access to the US$-nominated off-shore loans at low interest rates. Because of the availability of cheap loans and the speculative demand for housing, financial institutions and real estate developers did not conduct market research and invested in doubtful projects, resulting in an enormous oversupply of housing. The close relationship between bankers, developers and politicians ensured that the government would bail out insolvent real estate companies and financial institutions. In 1996, exports fell and the economy stopped growing due to increased international competition. Unhedged foreign debts reached  dangerous levels and speculative attacks forced the government to devalue the currency. Real estate companies and financial institutions would have  collapsed without the continued bail-outs by the government. However, the government’s non-transparent policies eroded the confidence of the general public and international investors, resulting in capital flight and a serious financial and economic crisis.”

Actors: National Housing Authority, Government Housing Bank, Expats, Securities Exchange Commission, Real Estate Developers (i.e. Bangkok Land, Somprasong Land), Banks (Bangkok Bank, Thai Farmers Bank, Krung Thai Bank, Siam Commercial Bank), Ministry of Finance, Finance companies (General Finance, Nava Finance, Asia Credit, Dhana Siam, Finance One), Credit Fonciers (Thanakorn Credit Foncier, Housing Finance Credit Foncier, Land and House Credit Foncier), Bank of Thailand, Agency for Real Estate Affairs, the Central Valuation Authority, Government Savings Bank, IMF/World Bank, Property Loan Management Organization.

UN-HABITAT website

24 Apr

UN-HABITAT (http://www.unhabitat.org/)

Summary:

So I’m not sure how to summarise a website but essentially we all must have used it so far for our essays and reports sooner or later within the past year so I won’t describe what is on the website. But I search the Baan Mankong Programme in the search box on the website and it led to a page with links:

http://www.google.com/custom?q=Baan%20Mankong%20Programme&cof=LW:350;L:http://www.unhabitat.org/images/un_habitat_header.gif;LH:71;AH:left;GL:0;S:http://www.unhabitat.org/;AWFID:68a6b7c680718fd7;&domains=www.unhabitat.org&sitesearch=www.unhabitat.org&proxystylesheet=http://www.unhabitat.org/google/google-unhabitat.xsl

The key words and buzzwords that repeat comprise World Habitat Day 2005, Land & Tenure, Land and housing problems, upgrading projects, slum upgrading facility, slum and poor communities amongst others.

The “cities housing poor” link opens a pdf for further reading; housing the poor in Asian cities: the Community-based Organisations: poor as agents of development, created by UN-HABITAT.

Other than that it’s useful for gaining development information and resources.


Scaling Up Slums and Squatter Settlements Upgrading in Thailand Leading to Community-Driven Integrated Social Development at City-Wide Level

24 Apr

Boonyabancha, Somsook. Scaling Up Slums and Squatter Settlements Upgrading in Thailand Leading to Community-Driven Integrated Social Development at City-Wide Level, a paper presented at the Arusha Conference, New Frontiers of Social Policy, Arusha, Tanzania, 12-15 December 2005.

(http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRANETSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/Resources/Boonyabanchapaper.rev.1.pdf) Accessed 31 January 2011.

Summary:

Community-driven approach to social development of communities at grassroots level for the improvement of urban slums and squatter settlements. The author talks about the Baan Mankong Program launched by the Thai Government and implemented through CODI. It is a support system for urban poor formed by networks of urban poor communities to develop their own upgrading and land development programs. It acknowledges urban poor people and enhances their rights to the city through dealing with issues of land tenure, ownership and partnering and collaborative projects.


Notes from the text:

Acceptance and recognition of the poor community: “change the relationships between urban poor communities and local governments so these communities become accepted as legitimate parts of the city and have more space and freedom to develop their own responses” (p1).

Upgrading and land development: “The programme is unusual both for its scale and for the way it is structured – with support provided to community-organizations formed by urban poor groups to develop their own comprehensive upgrading and land development programmes” (p2).

Partnerships and collaborations: “the need for all the different community-driven upgrading initiatives to form part of city-wide programmes in which networks of urban poor organizations work in partnership with local governments and other local development actors in city-wide upgrading process and building joint capacity for community-driven development together” (ibid).

The program is partly trying to achieve the goals set by the Millennium Development Goals to make significant improvements to the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers by 2020. Although it recognises that it cannot only be through physical improvements but also requires managerial systems and changes in relationships between residents of informal settlements and the authorities.

Forced evictions: “A commitment to upgrading also means a step away from forced eviction programmes although it does not promise any long-term solution” (p3).

Rights to the city: “a mild form of recognition that these communities were part of the city” (ibid).

“But these initial attempts of upgrading did not know how to deal with these urban poor communities’ status, with their illegality, with their contravention of by-laws and many other aspects. So drains and walkways were provided, as a kind of reluctant, humanitarian gesture, without ever fully accepting that these slums were viable urban settlements” (ibid).

Land security – ownership and tenure: the Kampung improvement programme in Indonesia was the only example whereby the community was fully accepted and provided with secure land tenure in Asia.

Examples of community and civic/NGO movements and partnerships between community-based organisations and community networks and government agencies had been occurring in Thailand since the 1980s. NOTE: this was before the formation of the Millennium Development Goals in 2000.

Boonyabancha describes how UCDO and Rural Development Fund merged to form CODI, please refer to the Community Development Fund in Thailand: A Tool for Poverty Reduction and Affordable Housing abstract as it duplicates the information by the same author.

Community support networks formed according to shared issues such as occupation, pooled savings, co-op housing, land tenure, city, and canals and undertake collaborative communal activities to problem solve.

Merger enabled coverage of both urban and rural communities: “The emphasis on supporting community-managed savings and loan groups and community remains, but it now covers 30,000 rural community organizations as well as the urban community organizations” (p7).

The Thai Government introduced two new programs to address issues of housing for people in the low income band; Baan Mankong (secure housing) Program and the Baan Ua Arthorn (we care) Program in January 2003. Baan Mankong deals with government funds being directly channelled to urban community organisations for issues such as infrastructure, land and housing. In the Baan Ua Arthorn Program the NHA designs, constructs and sells ready-to-occupy flats and houses at reduced rates to low-income households. NOTE: same information as provided in Community Development Fund in Thailand: A Tool for Poverty Reduction and Affordable Housing abstract of the text by the same author.

Collective ownership, management and responsibilities: “Power to decide will be based on communities since community is the owner of the projects as a group. Community will also have to take responsibilities as a group collectively to manage loan for housing construction or land purchase” (p8).

Baan Mankong Program plan:

“2003: upgrading ten pilot communities (1,500 units) and preparations in 20 cities

2004: upgrading 174 slum communities (15,000 units) in 42 cities and preparations in 50 more…

2005-2007: upgrading 285,000 units in 20 cities” (ibid).

Methodology:

  • identify stakeholders and explain program
  • organise network and community meetings
  • establish joint committee to oversee development
  • conduct city meeting where joint committees meets representatives from all urban poor communities
  • organise survey covering all communities (info  on households, housing security, land ownership, infrastructure problems, community organisations, savings activities and existing development activities)
  • from the survey develop a community upgrading plan covering whole city
  • support community savings group (while above is happening)
  • select pilot projects based on the needs, the communities’ willingness to implement them and learning possibilities
  • extend improvement program to other communities
  • integrate upgrading initiatives into city-wide development
  • build community networks around common land ownership
  • create economic space for the poor or economic opportunities
  • support constant exchange between projects, cities and regions (p9-10)

How it differs from other upgrading programs:

  • urban poor communities and their networks are key actors
  • ‘demand-driven’ by communities rather than supply-driven
  • The program does not specify standard physical outputs
  • It promotes more physical upgrading
  • It helps trigger acceptance of low-income communities as legitimate parts of the city
  • Secure land tenure is negotiated in each case locally

Six pilot projects:

  1. Land purchase and re-blocking: Charoenchai Nimitmai comprising 81 households living on 0.7ha land in Bangkok between an expressway and a drainage canal
  2. Post-fire reconstruction and a long-term lease: Bon Kai comprising 566 households living on land owned by the Crown Property Bureau in Klong Toey, central Bangkok
  3. Relocation to nearby land: Klong Toey Block 7-12 comprising port workers, daily labourers and small traders residing in squatter settlement housing block on land owned by the Port Authority of Bangkok
  4. Scaling up pilot projects: two schemes in the Ramkhamhaeng area of Bangkok; 124-family squatter community on 0.8ha of land and 34 famlies occupying 0.8ha of marshy land both owned by the Crown Property Bureau
  5. Land sharing: Klong Lumnoon’s canal-side community
  6. The relocation of mini squatters and a long-term lease: Bon Kook community comprising 124 households in the northern Thai city of Uttaradit (p12-14)

Decentralising actions within cities supported: “Community Upgrading is one powerful way to spark off this kind of decentralization and become an active part of city development activities actively participate by communities which will turn out to be active citizen groups of the city” (p15).

Six techniques used in the Baan Mankong Program include pilot projects, learning centres, big events, exchanges and sub-contracting. The program is instigated in other cities through city-wide processes.

Results have “shown that about 60% of families have been facing various kinds of eviction or illegals always become first priorities selected by joint city groups to be pilot projects to start for the city together” (p18).

“Urban poor groups learn by comparing what is being done in another community with what they know well…[when they] begin to understand this together, it is empowering” (p19).

The choice of pilot scheme varies with particular scheme and generally aims to be undertaken by the community for the community: “The communities in different cities choose their pilots according to all sorts of criteria. The important issue here is that the group understands the reasons for choosing the pilot projects” (ibid).

Power relations: “Almost all systems related to power and wealth and key decisions about development in our societies are vertical system. Therefore, the emergence of horizontal platforms or linkages to balance those so many vertical strings are very important” (p21).

“Legal versus illegal, the space between the system of authority and the system of poverty and illegality is a space of tension, fear, uncertainty: evictions and clashes” (p22).

Urban acupuncture: set up of networks of communities exchanging knowledge and experiences in city-wide programs. The pilot projects are a way of setting precedents of successful or not so successful projects and points of learning for communities. Involving local architects in the process is beneficial for the provision of good technical support.

In order for the Baan Mankong Program to be successful it is imperative that:

  • The upgrading includes everyone in the community regardless of class, tenure, status
  • Land tenure should be collective wherever possible
  • There should be collective planning and implementation of the upgrading work
  • Housing loans are given to the community organisation not individuals
  • Community social welfare systems are built up

Citizenship, empowerment and social upgrading: “When we improve land tenure, in fact, we have improved poor people’s rights and security, we are actually changing their status in the city, their citizenship in the city also undergoes a change, through the upgrading process…Poorer groups have to have confidence in their ability to do things. They need to start believing in their own power, energy and ability – this is social upgrading” (p26).

The community’s “ability to manage funds is the key to freedom to development…upgrading is not something individual upgrading is something that arises from people living together, strengthening each other and wanting to develop, to go forward” (p28).

“Land becomes a collective – NOT INDIVIDUAL! – asset” (p29).

It is important to build community capacity and self-belief as opposed to prescribed solutions that do not allow for learning or growth. The Baan Mankong Program is about ownership, value, self-belief and community.


Actors:

Thai Government, Municipality, Central Government Development Agency, Policy makers, Mayer, CODI, DANCED, NHA, World Bank, UCDO, Rural Development Fund, Universities and Academics (local and international), Community representatives, leaders and networks, Japanese Government, Ministry of Social Development and Human Security, Professionals (architects, young architects, contractors), NGOs, Landowners (public and private), Port Authority of Thailand, Crown Property Bureau (CPB), Bon Kai, Klong Toey Block, Klong Lumnoon, Bon Kook, and Charoenchai Nimitmai communities, Monks


Community Development Fund in Thailand: A Tool for Poverty Reduction and Affordable Housing

24 Apr

Boonyabancha, Somsook for UN-HABITAT. Community Development Fund in Thailand: A Tool for Poverty Reduction and Affordable Housing, Nairobi, 2009.

(http://www.unhabitat.org/pmss/getElectronicVersion.asp?nr=2782&alt=1) Accessed 31 January 2011.

Summary:

The report conveys the emergence of the Community Development Fund in Thailand. It talks about the development of CODI from the merging of two organisations; UCDO (Urban Community Development Office) and the Rural Development Fund in 2000. The relations with various actors in the field and the various types of funding available are highlighted. The case of the Baan Mankong Program is discussed in terms of the types of upgrading programs, how to implement the program, different funding options, how Baan Mankong differs from other upgrading approaches, how it improves people’s assets, and its achievements to date.  The document culminates with the results and impacts of the Community Development Fund generally for communities at large but focuses on the case of Ruam Samakee Reconstruction Project in Bangkok

Notes from the text:

“The Community Development Fund model supports poor communities in organizing savings groups and improves their capacity to manage their fund or the loans for community development activities” (p1).

Background:

In the early 1980’s Thailand was going through transformations due to rapid economic development; the private sector was booming, bank loans and finances were accessible, many construction and infrastructure projects were implemented and the services sector and middle class was growing.

But income share was widening the gap between the rich and the poor; the top 20% had 60% while the bottom 20% only had 3% of the total income. “Poor security of land tenure and the lack of infrastructure resulted in a deteriorating living condition for the urban poor” (p4). Approximately 20% were living in low income settlements in 1990 with 13% facing eviction, 3,500 informal settlements had formed with insecure tenure and poor services, infrastructure and living conditions. They had no legal protection.

The National Housing Authority (NHA) planned relocation of the urban poor was only partially successful as it did not secure livelihood opportunities without which many couldn’t afford to repay the loans/costs of the new homes. Therefore many tended return to the squatter areas.

Urban Community Development Office (UCDO):

The Urban Community Development Office (UCDO) was set up in 1992 by Thai Government to address urban poverty. It was initially under the National Housing Authority (NHA) during its early stages although its administration and development processes remained independent.

UCDO had an initial capital fund of Thai Baht 1250 million (US$ 35.7 million) to provide loans to organised communities for housing, land acquisition and income generation; these were available for community-based savings groups able to manage community finances; the loans would respond to particular needs and have low interest rates (lower than market rates). It was important for the funds to be flexible to the needs of the community.

Communities formed savings and credit groups which UCDO facilitated and “also supported communities in a particular city or province to form networks, to negotiate as a block with city or provincial authorities, or to work together on shared problems of housing, livelihoods, basic services and community enterprise, according to their needs, situation and changing context” (p2). Community networks were formed.

Larger scale community networks led to community-led development and UCDO formed links with other governmental and bilateral agencies. The Danish (Danish Cooperation for Environment and Development) and Japanese Governments, and the World Bank (Social Investment Fund) have funded programs. Welfare funds were established to further support the poorer communities gain access to grants for education and income generation.

The two important elements of the UCDO are institutional development and administrative strategy. The factors that supported the creation of the UCDO were the availability of Government finance, Government Policies, experiences from the past and from other countries, and rural community savings groups. The aim of the program was to “improve living conditions and increase the organizational capacity of urban poor communities through…community’s savings and credit groups and…integrated loans at favorable interest rate” (p7). This would also be promoting communities’ capability to be self-sufficient by drawing out existing skills and knowledge.

By 2000 (8 years of operation): there were 950 community savings groups supporting 53 out of 76 Thai provinces. Although it was becoming clear how limited the activities were under the admin system of the NHA.  So UCDO merged with the Rural Development Fund (which was in a similar position with the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB)) to form Community Organisations Development Institute (CODI) in 2000.

Community Organisations Development Institute (CODI):

Royal Decree enabled CODI to be a new public organisation under the Ministry of Social Development and Human Security thus enabling it to have “its own legal entity to apply to the annual government budget directly” (p3). The merger meant that CODI’s initial capital fund was Thai Baht 2.899 billion (US$ 82.85 million) combining UCDO’s Thai Baht 2.156 million and Rural Development Fund’s Thai Baht 734 million.

In 2003 CODI proposed the Baan Mankong Program to the Thai Government that would “address land and housing problems of low-income sectors which targeted 2000 communities in 200 cities” (p3). The government allowed a budget for the “infrastructure and housing loan interest subsidies” (p3).

“The major lesson is that there is a need to support the poor themselves in becoming important players in the development process. The poor must be involved in decision making processes and in control of the activities that follow” (p3).

Urban Community Development Fund

“The Urban Poor Development Fund (UPDF) was governed by UCDO’s Board of Directors which had full power over all UCDO policies” (p8). This comprised four representatives from the government, four elected community members, and three professionals from NGOs and the private sector. It was important to emphasise the importance of communities as the key drivers of programs and initiatives; to have equal level of influence in decision making.

The UPDF is a revolving fund which allows flexibility in the management of the process by community members. It reduced bureaucratic processes and supported communities directly. It reduced time and was more efficient in supporting the needs of the community while also creating links between the community and other actors in the development process. “Income earned on the fund would cover the administrative and development costs of all activities” (p9).

The types of loans offered comprised revolving funds, income generation, non-project based housing improvements and project based housing. There are four types of project based housing loans; purchasing land of an existing settlement or land, relocation, housing construction on leased or occupying NHA resettlement projects and infrastructure improvement. The conditions for loan applications included having organised savings activities within a community and an accurate and reliable accounting and financial management for at least six months. This meant that the more a community saved, the more it could borrow.

The various roles included UCDO providing technical support, the community networks supporting workshops for learning and capacity building, and the community collecting repayments and managing development processes. There were three parts of obtaining a loan firstly after applying through eligibility the loan has to be approved, the community needs to have collateral and then negotiate the repayment terms.

UCDO/CODI performance

General approach: drawing people together through community savings and loan activities, ground daily activities through financial mechanisms, provide opportunities for the urban poor through savings and loan activities, and create ongoing learning enabling involvement of all members of the community.

Community networks: UCDO needed to find a way to revive capacity of communities to repay loans and transfer this responsibility from individuals to communal level. The process resulted in the creation of community networks to “work and share responsibilities in the form of a network” (p16) with linkages through district, city or national scale or sector based. These connections enabled communities to deal with issues such as housing, infrastructure, land, education, health and planning. The community networks share “common rules, norms, and simple coordinating structure and taskforce bases on various activities that are planned and agreed together” (ibid). The community networks enabled a platform for communities to learn from each other’s experiences and strengthen community relations.

The community networks and linkages with existing development agencies and other actors assisted in forming the Local Development Committee in each city. Other organisations encouraged to form links with included local authorities, NGOs, professionals, federations, and the government. In urban areas these groups were called the Urban Community Development Committees. Development activities were subcontracted to municipalities and NGOs. NGOs, community networks and local authorities were given direct financial support to undertake development projects.

The Baan Mankong Program

The Thai Government introduced two new programs to address issues of housing for people in the low income band; Baan Mankong (secure housing) Program and the Baan Ua Arthorn (we care) Program in January 2003. Baan Mankong deals with government funds being directly channelled to urban community organisations for issues such as infrastructure, land and housing. In the Baan Ua Arthorn Program the NHA designs, constructs and sells ready-to-occupy flats and houses at reduced rates to low-income households.

“The Baan Mankong Program was specifically set up to support upgrading processes that are designed and managed by existing low-income communities and networks” (p19) that work with universities, professionals and local authorities to implement upgrading initiatives. The Program has a target of “improving the housing, living conditions and tenure security of about 200,000 poor households, in 2000 poor communities in 200 cities, within five years” (ibid, as of 2009) and is a demand-driven approach.

The Baan Mankong Program is implemented in the following stages:

  1. Identifying relevant stakeholders and explaining the program
  2. Organising community meetings for stakeholders to take ownership of the program
  3. Establishing joint committees to manage the implementation process
  4. Creating joint mechanisms to collectively plan and implement housing development
  5. Gathering information
  6. Creating an improvement plan
  7. Establishing collective community savings and loans groups
  8. Selecting and assigning pilot projects
  9. Developing plans for launching the program

The types of Baan Mankong Upgrading Program are:

  • On-site Upgrading (improvements to settlements without changing layouts and plot sizes)
  • On-site Reblocking (infrastructural improvements and lay-out of housing in existing settlements)
  • On-site Reconstruction (existing settlements completely demolished and rebuilt on the same land through a long-term lease or community ownership)
  • Land sharing (both landowners and communities share land, e.g. Ruam Samakee, Tung Wah and Klong Lumnoon)
  • Relocation

There are three main types of funding available through the program:

  1. Government subsidies (housing, administrative and capacity building subsidies)
  2. Long-term loans for housing development
  3. Household savings

How is it different from conventional upgrading approaches?

  • Allows urban poor communities and networks to be the main actors (control funding, manage projects, implement improvements, and undertake building activities)
  • It is community demand-driven with priority given to communities ready to execute their own improvements
  • Variety of solutions to fit the particular needs of communities
  • Allows flexibility for communities to coordinate with local partners and agencies
  • CODI acts as facilitator
  • It enables the changes to community social structures
  • Helps to trigger acceptance of the low-income communities once changes have been implemented
  • Secure land tenure negotiated for most communities by individuals with emphasis on collective rather than individual land tenure

So far 1,250 community initiatives are in operation, 76,792 households have been improved and the program is working in 237 cities in Thailand.

Interesting quotes:

“As a result of settlement upgrading, the issue of land tenure has been resolved, shacks and makeshifts are replaced by permanent housing and necessary utilities and basic services are put in place” (p24).

“Secure land tenure is essential in allowing this development to happen and opens up the gate for additional energy, development resources and investment to flow into these communities” (ibid).

“Property rights bring with them a sense of legitimacy, infrastructure improvements, while creating a much-needed capital, and the participation of the poor” (p25).

Conclusion

The general impacts on UPCD:

  • Increase in community organisation and networks
  • Increase in community assets and direct financial resources
  • Increased community management and entrepreneurship skills
  • Development of more diverse housing solutions from individual projects to city processes
  • Development of large scale community welfare activities
  • Communities have stronger status and can develop better partnerships with local authorities and other development actors
  • Changing the way how development institutions are managed

Case Study: Ruam Samakee Community

Squatter community comprising 124 families on 0.89ha of swamp land in the Ramkhamhaeng Soi 39 in Bangkok owned by the Crown Property Bureau (CPB). The community comprised of migrants from north-eastern Thailand such as vendors in unregulated factories and labourers from the Ramkhamhaeng business area.

CPB initially wanted to lease the land to a private developer with the permission to evict the occupants. However the Ruam Samakee Community organised themselves into savings groups and set up a welfare program and through lengthy negotiation processes managed to obtain a long-term lease of the land, returning 0.16ha of land and rebuilding houses on the remaining 0.73ha plot on a collective long-term lease.

After the initiation of the Baan Mankong Program, the Ruam Samakee Community was selected as one of the pilot projects. Two young architects from the Community Organisation Development Office “began working with the people to help develop a new layout plan, with three lines of row-houses arranged along two lanes, a small community center and a playground” (p28).

The upgrading program comprised creation of new housing (detached-twin houses, row houses and flats for rent), land and tenure status, management of housing construction costs, creation of housing standards, provision of basic services and enabling the housing to be affordable. By 2008 all 124 units had been constructed, with a raised level of land to prevent flooding and new infrastructure. These pilot projects influenced the initiation of development projects of seven other informal settlements on CPB land in the area.

The financial sustainability of the program can be observed through three indicators; community savings activity, community investment in their housing and social contract binding the community together.

Actors:

CODI (Community Organisations Development Institute), Rural Development Fund, UCDO (Urban Community Development Office), Crown Property Bureau (CPB), DANCED (Danish Cooperation for Environment and Development), the Duang Prateep Foundation, Human Development Center, Human Settlement Federation, NESDB (National Economic and Social Development Board), NHA (National Housing Authority), POFD (People’s Organisation for Development), UNESCAP (United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific), Urban Community Development Committees, Thai Government, Municipalities, Local Authorities, NGOs, Federations, Professionals, Savings Groups, Community Networks, Local Academics/Universities, Ruam Samakee Community