Energy Access in Urban Slums: A case of Khon Kaen, Thailand; Asian Institute of Technology

The article discusses how accessible are modern forms of energy focusing on urban and peri-urban areas of Thailand, the energy consumption patterns and the total energy related expenditures in urban poor and peri urban areas. Secondly it discusses the impact of past and planned energy policies on the current energy situation.

The initial assessment study was primarily focused on Bangkok. In Bangkok and its suburbs electricity is distributed by a single utility, the Metropolitan Electricity Authority (MEA) and in the rest of the country the electricity is distributed by the Provincial Electricity Authority (PEA).” In year 2005, 87.5% of the population had access to grid electricity (DEDE, 2005). 99% of the registered households have electricity connection (AESIEAP, 2007)., Biomass accounts for 33% of the total household energy consumption in Thailand. 57.5% of the households cook with LPG while only 32.8% of households cook with traditional biomass (NSO, 2005b). Renewable energy had a share of 16.9% in the total primary energy supply in year 2004.” the Parliament Office recognises that modern energy sources represent only a small portion of energy consumed in poor areas due to higher cost and limited supply in rural areas.

The two main policies affecting the energy access for the urban poor are policies on household registration and electricity pricing. The household registration is required to apply for different services, including electricity. Majority of slum households do not meet requirements for household registration. According to survey almost 60% of households were not registered( based on Bangkok slums only).

Electricity Pricing Policy

The Metropolitan Electricity Authority provides reduced tariff for households consuming up to an average of 150kWh per month over a period of 3 months; otherwise the household faces the regular tariff. This scheme is only available to registered households. The electricity tariff increases at a higher level than an average income for both poor and non-poor.

House Registration Policy

In 1956 house registration was introduced in Thailand. Currently the house registration is required to access ant type of government services, ie. citizenship, healthcare, education, banking services and electricity connection. In the slums some dwellers do not have house registration which affects their access to the electricity. To overcome this problem, in 1995 the Thai government began to issue temporary registration numbers to those households who do not have permanent registration number. This allowed the households to apply for the legal connection to the electricity supply, however the initial deposit for the electric meter is higher for the temporary registered households. This policy substantially reduced the number of illegal connections (connection through the neighbor) in Thailand. In Bangkok slums 68% of households have a direct connection to the grid and 32% through their neighbors.

Territorialisation and State Power in Thailand; Peter Vandergeest and Nancy Lee Peluso

The article initially elaborates on different work of political geographers in recent years and explains different theories on state powers. Its draws the attention that many of theories do not incorporate the territorial strategies used by modern states in the definitions. Rulers territorialized state power firstly to make claims on territory to protect access to people and income from taxes and natural resources. Secondly territorialisation enabled increased efficiency in collection of regular taxes, which was needed to finance permanent militaries, assess the availability of young men for a conscript military and to finance a growing bureaucracy as well as government investment that sustained local production in context of global competition.

 Territorialisation is described to be about excluding or including people within particular geographic boundaries, and about controlling what people do and their access to natural resources within those boundaries.

In Thai context, the State has divided its territories into complex and overlapping political and economic zones, rearranged people and resources within these units and created regulations delineating how and by whom these areas can be used. In addition the state has increased its capacity and willingness to deploy violent means of land-use control, in part due to its involvement in the global political-economy and the high stakes in the export-led economic growth strategies.

The article focuses specifically on the territorialisation of resources and people in rural areas: 1) The territorialisation of civil administration in rural Thailand 2) state attempts to take over the administration of rights to land through mandatory registration of land titles based on surveys  3) state attempts to control the use of major portions of national territory by demarcating it and defining it as forest.

Rangsit in transition: urbanisation and cultural adaptation in central Thailand

Sowatree Nathalang

The Chao Phraya Delta: Historical Development, Dynamics and Challenges of Thailand’s Rice Bowl (1999)

This study looks at the effects of ‘modernisation and development’ on the 3 following case studies:  an Old Chinese community, an Old Muslim community and a Modern Workers’ community.

Over a period of 30 years many of the bordering provinces to Bangkok have been affected by urbanisation and find themselves part of a greater cosmopolitan area.  This has attracted many people from wider Thailand and from around the world to the area seeking economic and social opportunities.  This has also brought with it a mix of cultures and identities.  The effects on the landscape have been an increase of industrial plants where agricultural land once was, and an increase in residential and commercial properties.

This study focuses on the cultural and spiritual effects of globalisation and urbanisation.

The rangsit area was a largely agricultural area used for rice farming which then extended to include a variety of crops and plantations.  Its geographical location made it a focus for industry and commercial expansion creating a new urban centre.  The main areas which have facilitated change in the area are the location, the transport links and the price of the land.

Glocalisation – as a concept

This term emerges from two different models; Globalisation and Localisation.  A blending of  cultures has taken place as a result of imperialism leading to a dichotomy  between local and global culture.  Cultural imperialism is of the view that the local culture has been destoyed by the western global culture.  Cultural hybrisation suggests however that it is not possible for culture to be pure, it is always a hybrid, “culture is dynamic, adapted and acculturated”.

Desakota: A new concept of city

These regions are characterised by a mix of “agricultural and non-agricultural activities developed upon a single economic and social plan in close proximity to large urban centres”. The regions will contain strong transport links to major Asian urban areas and include entire cities and their rural-urban and semi-urban peripheral zones.

Changes and adaptation

– Consumerism – consumer goods are affecting peoples’ day to day lives and challenging cultural and value systems

-Labour force from bordering areas are brought to the region by people acting as agents

-Client-patron relationships – can be seen across members of all communities (e.g.landlord – tenant)

-Religious leaders become elevated in their communities, a respected and valued position

– Ethnic roles can change – Muslims who were renters now become landlords, and buddhists who were once landlords can be renters

-The varied role of the Temple has diminished, where it was the first education provider it has been supplanted by the schools; people now prefer malls, pubs and restaurants as meeting places

-The workers community interact through daily consumption needs not through ethnic origin or background

– adaptation vs loss of culture and cultural identity

– Older generation must adapt and compromise to fit in to new pattern of society

– Priorities for younger generation are employment and consuming

– People share similar global capitalist values which are present in the worlds major cities

– There is a lack of community solidarity specifically at the macro level – does there have to a definitive traditional ‘community’?

Scaling Up Slums and Squatter Settlements Upgrading in Thailand Leading to Community-Driven Integrated Social Development at City-Wide Level

Boonyabancha, Somsook. Scaling Up Slums and Squatter Settlements Upgrading in Thailand Leading to Community-Driven Integrated Social Development at City-Wide Level, a paper presented at the Arusha Conference, New Frontiers of Social Policy, Arusha, Tanzania, 12-15 December 2005.

(http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRANETSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/Resources/Boonyabanchapaper.rev.1.pdf) Accessed 31 January 2011.

Summary:

Community-driven approach to social development of communities at grassroots level for the improvement of urban slums and squatter settlements. The author talks about the Baan Mankong Program launched by the Thai Government and implemented through CODI. It is a support system for urban poor formed by networks of urban poor communities to develop their own upgrading and land development programs. It acknowledges urban poor people and enhances their rights to the city through dealing with issues of land tenure, ownership and partnering and collaborative projects.

Notes from the text:

Acceptance and recognition of the poor community: “change the relationships between urban poor communities and local governments so these communities become accepted as legitimate parts of the city and have more space and freedom to develop their own responses” (p1).

Upgrading and land development: “The programme is unusual both for its scale and for the way it is structured – with support provided to community-organizations formed by urban poor groups to develop their own comprehensive upgrading and land development programmes” (p2).

Partnerships and collaborations: “the need for all the different community-driven upgrading initiatives to form part of city-wide programmes in which networks of urban poor organizations work in partnership with local governments and other local development actors in city-wide upgrading process and building joint capacity for community-driven development together” (ibid).

The program is partly trying to achieve the goals set by the Millennium Development Goals to make significant improvements to the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers by 2020. Although it recognises that it cannot only be through physical improvements but also requires managerial systems and changes in relationships between residents of informal settlements and the authorities.

Forced evictions: “A commitment to upgrading also means a step away from forced eviction programmes although it does not promise any long-term solution” (p3).

Rights to the city: “a mild form of recognition that these communities were part of the city” (ibid).

“But these initial attempts of upgrading did not know how to deal with these urban poor communities’ status, with their illegality, with their contravention of by-laws and many other aspects. So drains and walkways were provided, as a kind of reluctant, humanitarian gesture, without ever fully accepting that these slums were viable urban settlements” (ibid).

Land security – ownership and tenure: the Kampung improvement programme in Indonesia was the only example whereby the community was fully accepted and provided with secure land tenure in Asia.

Examples of community and civic/NGO movements and partnerships between community-based organisations and community networks and government agencies had been occurring in Thailand since the 1980s. NOTE: this was before the formation of the Millennium Development Goals in 2000.

Boonyabancha describes how UCDO and Rural Development Fund merged to form CODI, please refer to the Community Development Fund in Thailand: A Tool for Poverty Reduction and Affordable Housing abstract as it duplicates the information by the same author.

Community support networks formed according to shared issues such as occupation, pooled savings, co-op housing, land tenure, city, and canals and undertake collaborative communal activities to problem solve.

Merger enabled coverage of both urban and rural communities: “The emphasis on supporting community-managed savings and loan groups and community remains, but it now covers 30,000 rural community organizations as well as the urban community organizations” (p7).

The Thai Government introduced two new programs to address issues of housing for people in the low income band; Baan Mankong (secure housing) Program and the Baan Ua Arthorn (we care) Program in January 2003. Baan Mankong deals with government funds being directly channelled to urban community organisations for issues such as infrastructure, land and housing. In the Baan Ua Arthorn Program the NHA designs, constructs and sells ready-to-occupy flats and houses at reduced rates to low-income households. NOTE: same information as provided in Community Development Fund in Thailand: A Tool for Poverty Reduction and Affordable Housing abstract of the text by the same author.

Collective ownership, management and responsibilities: “Power to decide will be based on communities since community is the owner of the projects as a group. Community will also have to take responsibilities as a group collectively to manage loan for housing construction or land purchase” (p8).

Baan Mankong Program plan:

“2003: upgrading ten pilot communities (1,500 units) and preparations in 20 cities

2004: upgrading 174 slum communities (15,000 units) in 42 cities and preparations in 50 more…

2005-2007: upgrading 285,000 units in 20 cities” (ibid).

Methodology:

• identify stakeholders and explain program
• organise network and community meetings
• establish joint committee to oversee development
• conduct city meeting where joint committees meets representatives from all urban poor communities
• organise survey covering all communities (info  on households, housing security, land ownership, infrastructure problems, community organisations, savings activities and existing development activities)
• from the survey develop a community upgrading plan covering whole city
• support community savings group (while above is happening)
• select pilot projects based on the needs, the communities’ willingness to implement them and learning possibilities
• extend improvement program to other communities
• integrate upgrading initiatives into city-wide development
• build community networks around common land ownership
• create economic space for the poor or economic opportunities
• support constant exchange between projects, cities and regions (p9-10)

How it differs from other upgrading programs:

• urban poor communities and their networks are key actors
• ‘demand-driven’ by communities rather than supply-driven
• The program does not specify standard physical outputs
• It promotes more physical upgrading
• It helps trigger acceptance of low-income communities as legitimate parts of the city
• Secure land tenure is negotiated in each case locally

Six pilot projects:

1. Land purchase and re-blocking: Charoenchai Nimitmai comprising 81 households living on 0.7ha land in Bangkok between an expressway and a drainage canal
2. Post-fire reconstruction and a long-term lease: Bon Kai comprising 566 households living on land owned by the Crown Property Bureau in Klong Toey, central Bangkok
3. Relocation to nearby land: Klong Toey Block 7-12 comprising port workers, daily labourers and small traders residing in squatter settlement housing block on land owned by the Port Authority of Bangkok
4. Scaling up pilot projects: two schemes in the Ramkhamhaeng area of Bangkok; 124-family squatter community on 0.8ha of land and 34 famlies occupying 0.8ha of marshy land both owned by the Crown Property Bureau
5. Land sharing: Klong Lumnoon’s canal-side community
6. The relocation of mini squatters and a long-term lease: Bon Kook community comprising 124 households in the northern Thai city of Uttaradit (p12-14)

Decentralising actions within cities supported: “Community Upgrading is one powerful way to spark off this kind of decentralization and become an active part of city development activities actively participate by communities which will turn out to be active citizen groups of the city” (p15).

Six techniques used in the Baan Mankong Program include pilot projects, learning centres, big events, exchanges and sub-contracting. The program is instigated in other cities through city-wide processes.

Results have “shown that about 60% of families have been facing various kinds of eviction or illegals always become first priorities selected by joint city groups to be pilot projects to start for the city together” (p18).

“Urban poor groups learn by comparing what is being done in another community with what they know well…[when they] begin to understand this together, it is empowering” (p19).

The choice of pilot scheme varies with particular scheme and generally aims to be undertaken by the community for the community: “The communities in different cities choose their pilots according to all sorts of criteria. The important issue here is that the group understands the reasons for choosing the pilot projects” (ibid).

Power relations: “Almost all systems related to power and wealth and key decisions about development in our societies are vertical system. Therefore, the emergence of horizontal platforms or linkages to balance those so many vertical strings are very important” (p21).

“Legal versus illegal, the space between the system of authority and the system of poverty and illegality is a space of tension, fear, uncertainty: evictions and clashes” (p22).

Urban acupuncture: set up of networks of communities exchanging knowledge and experiences in city-wide programs. The pilot projects are a way of setting precedents of successful or not so successful projects and points of learning for communities. Involving local architects in the process is beneficial for the provision of good technical support.

In order for the Baan Mankong Program to be successful it is imperative that:

• The upgrading includes everyone in the community regardless of class, tenure, status
• Land tenure should be collective wherever possible
• There should be collective planning and implementation of the upgrading work
• Housing loans are given to the community organisation not individuals
• Community social welfare systems are built up

Citizenship, empowerment and social upgrading: “When we improve land tenure, in fact, we have improved poor people’s rights and security, we are actually changing their status in the city, their citizenship in the city also undergoes a change, through the upgrading process…Poorer groups have to have confidence in their ability to do things. They need to start believing in their own power, energy and ability – this is social upgrading” (p26).

The community’s “ability to manage funds is the key to freedom to development…upgrading is not something individual upgrading is something that arises from people living together, strengthening each other and wanting to develop, to go forward” (p28).

“Land becomes a collective – NOT INDIVIDUAL! – asset” (p29).

It is important to build community capacity and self-belief as opposed to prescribed solutions that do not allow for learning or growth. The Baan Mankong Program is about ownership, value, self-belief and community.

Actors:

Thai Government, Municipality, Central Government Development Agency, Policy makers, Mayer, CODI, DANCED, NHA, World Bank, UCDO, Rural Development Fund, Universities and Academics (local and international), Community representatives, leaders and networks, Japanese Government, Ministry of Social Development and Human Security, Professionals (architects, young architects, contractors), NGOs, Landowners (public and private), Port Authority of Thailand, Crown Property Bureau (CPB), Bon Kai, Klong Toey Block, Klong Lumnoon, Bon Kook, and Charoenchai Nimitmai communities, Monks

Community Development Fund in Thailand: A Tool for Poverty Reduction and Affordable Housing

Boonyabancha, Somsook for UN-HABITAT. Community Development Fund in Thailand: A Tool for Poverty Reduction and Affordable Housing, Nairobi, 2009.

(http://www.unhabitat.org/pmss/getElectronicVersion.asp?nr=2782&alt=1) Accessed 31 January 2011.

Summary:

The report conveys the emergence of the Community Development Fund in Thailand. It talks about the development of CODI from the merging of two organisations; UCDO (Urban Community Development Office) and the Rural Development Fund in 2000. The relations with various actors in the field and the various types of funding available are highlighted. The case of the Baan Mankong Program is discussed in terms of the types of upgrading programs, how to implement the program, different funding options, how Baan Mankong differs from other upgrading approaches, how it improves people’s assets, and its achievements to date.  The document culminates with the results and impacts of the Community Development Fund generally for communities at large but focuses on the case of Ruam Samakee Reconstruction Project in Bangkok

Notes from the text:

“The Community Development Fund model supports poor communities in organizing savings groups and improves their capacity to manage their fund or the loans for community development activities” (p1).

Background:

In the early 1980’s Thailand was going through transformations due to rapid economic development; the private sector was booming, bank loans and finances were accessible, many construction and infrastructure projects were implemented and the services sector and middle class was growing.

But income share was widening the gap between the rich and the poor; the top 20% had 60% while the bottom 20% only had 3% of the total income. “Poor security of land tenure and the lack of infrastructure resulted in a deteriorating living condition for the urban poor” (p4). Approximately 20% were living in low income settlements in 1990 with 13% facing eviction, 3,500 informal settlements had formed with insecure tenure and poor services, infrastructure and living conditions. They had no legal protection.

The National Housing Authority (NHA) planned relocation of the urban poor was only partially successful as it did not secure livelihood opportunities without which many couldn’t afford to repay the loans/costs of the new homes. Therefore many tended return to the squatter areas.

Urban Community Development Office (UCDO):

The Urban Community Development Office (UCDO) was set up in 1992 by Thai Government to address urban poverty. It was initially under the National Housing Authority (NHA) during its early stages although its administration and development processes remained independent.

UCDO had an initial capital fund of Thai Baht 1250 million (US$ 35.7 million) to provide loans to organised communities for housing, land acquisition and income generation; these were available for community-based savings groups able to manage community finances; the loans would respond to particular needs and have low interest rates (lower than market rates). It was important for the funds to be flexible to the needs of the community.

Communities formed savings and credit groups which UCDO facilitated and “also supported communities in a particular city or province to form networks, to negotiate as a block with city or provincial authorities, or to work together on shared problems of housing, livelihoods, basic services and community enterprise, according to their needs, situation and changing context” (p2). Community networks were formed.

Larger scale community networks led to community-led development and UCDO formed links with other governmental and bilateral agencies. The Danish (Danish Cooperation for Environment and Development) and Japanese Governments, and the World Bank (Social Investment Fund) have funded programs. Welfare funds were established to further support the poorer communities gain access to grants for education and income generation.

The two important elements of the UCDO are institutional development and administrative strategy. The factors that supported the creation of the UCDO were the availability of Government finance, Government Policies, experiences from the past and from other countries, and rural community savings groups. The aim of the program was to “improve living conditions and increase the organizational capacity of urban poor communities through…community’s savings and credit groups and…integrated loans at favorable interest rate” (p7). This would also be promoting communities’ capability to be self-sufficient by drawing out existing skills and knowledge.

By 2000 (8 years of operation): there were 950 community savings groups supporting 53 out of 76 Thai provinces. Although it was becoming clear how limited the activities were under the admin system of the NHA.  So UCDO merged with the Rural Development Fund (which was in a similar position with the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB)) to form Community Organisations Development Institute (CODI) in 2000.

Community Organisations Development Institute (CODI):

Royal Decree enabled CODI to be a new public organisation under the Ministry of Social Development and Human Security thus enabling it to have “its own legal entity to apply to the annual government budget directly” (p3). The merger meant that CODI’s initial capital fund was Thai Baht 2.899 billion (US$ 82.85 million) combining UCDO’s Thai Baht 2.156 million and Rural Development Fund’s Thai Baht 734 million.

In 2003 CODI proposed the Baan Mankong Program to the Thai Government that would “address land and housing problems of low-income sectors which targeted 2000 communities in 200 cities” (p3). The government allowed a budget for the “infrastructure and housing loan interest subsidies” (p3).

“The major lesson is that there is a need to support the poor themselves in becoming important players in the development process. The poor must be involved in decision making processes and in control of the activities that follow” (p3).

Urban Community Development Fund

“The Urban Poor Development Fund (UPDF) was governed by UCDO’s Board of Directors which had full power over all UCDO policies” (p8). This comprised four representatives from the government, four elected community members, and three professionals from NGOs and the private sector. It was important to emphasise the importance of communities as the key drivers of programs and initiatives; to have equal level of influence in decision making.

The UPDF is a revolving fund which allows flexibility in the management of the process by community members. It reduced bureaucratic processes and supported communities directly. It reduced time and was more efficient in supporting the needs of the community while also creating links between the community and other actors in the development process. “Income earned on the fund would cover the administrative and development costs of all activities” (p9).

The types of loans offered comprised revolving funds, income generation, non-project based housing improvements and project based housing. There are four types of project based housing loans; purchasing land of an existing settlement or land, relocation, housing construction on leased or occupying NHA resettlement projects and infrastructure improvement. The conditions for loan applications included having organised savings activities within a community and an accurate and reliable accounting and financial management for at least six months. This meant that the more a community saved, the more it could borrow.

The various roles included UCDO providing technical support, the community networks supporting workshops for learning and capacity building, and the community collecting repayments and managing development processes. There were three parts of obtaining a loan firstly after applying through eligibility the loan has to be approved, the community needs to have collateral and then negotiate the repayment terms.

UCDO/CODI performance

General approach: drawing people together through community savings and loan activities, ground daily activities through financial mechanisms, provide opportunities for the urban poor through savings and loan activities, and create ongoing learning enabling involvement of all members of the community.

Community networks: UCDO needed to find a way to revive capacity of communities to repay loans and transfer this responsibility from individuals to communal level. The process resulted in the creation of community networks to “work and share responsibilities in the form of a network” (p16) with linkages through district, city or national scale or sector based. These connections enabled communities to deal with issues such as housing, infrastructure, land, education, health and planning. The community networks share “common rules, norms, and simple coordinating structure and taskforce bases on various activities that are planned and agreed together” (ibid). The community networks enabled a platform for communities to learn from each other’s experiences and strengthen community relations.

The community networks and linkages with existing development agencies and other actors assisted in forming the Local Development Committee in each city. Other organisations encouraged to form links with included local authorities, NGOs, professionals, federations, and the government. In urban areas these groups were called the Urban Community Development Committees. Development activities were subcontracted to municipalities and NGOs. NGOs, community networks and local authorities were given direct financial support to undertake development projects.

The Baan Mankong Program

The Thai Government introduced two new programs to address issues of housing for people in the low income band; Baan Mankong (secure housing) Program and the Baan Ua Arthorn (we care) Program in January 2003. Baan Mankong deals with government funds being directly channelled to urban community organisations for issues such as infrastructure, land and housing. In the Baan Ua Arthorn Program the NHA designs, constructs and sells ready-to-occupy flats and houses at reduced rates to low-income households.

“The Baan Mankong Program was specifically set up to support upgrading processes that are designed and managed by existing low-income communities and networks” (p19) that work with universities, professionals and local authorities to implement upgrading initiatives. The Program has a target of “improving the housing, living conditions and tenure security of about 200,000 poor households, in 2000 poor communities in 200 cities, within five years” (ibid, as of 2009) and is a demand-driven approach.

The Baan Mankong Program is implemented in the following stages:

1. Identifying relevant stakeholders and explaining the program
2. Organising community meetings for stakeholders to take ownership of the program
3. Establishing joint committees to manage the implementation process
4. Creating joint mechanisms to collectively plan and implement housing development
5. Gathering information
6. Creating an improvement plan
7. Establishing collective community savings and loans groups
8. Selecting and assigning pilot projects
9. Developing plans for launching the program

The types of Baan Mankong Upgrading Program are:

• On-site Upgrading (improvements to settlements without changing layouts and plot sizes)
• On-site Reblocking (infrastructural improvements and lay-out of housing in existing settlements)
• On-site Reconstruction (existing settlements completely demolished and rebuilt on the same land through a long-term lease or community ownership)
• Land sharing (both landowners and communities share land, e.g. Ruam Samakee, Tung Wah and Klong Lumnoon)
• Relocation

There are three main types of funding available through the program:

1. Government subsidies (housing, administrative and capacity building subsidies)
2. Long-term loans for housing development
3. Household savings

How is it different from conventional upgrading approaches?

• Allows urban poor communities and networks to be the main actors (control funding, manage projects, implement improvements, and undertake building activities)
• It is community demand-driven with priority given to communities ready to execute their own improvements
• Variety of solutions to fit the particular needs of communities
• Allows flexibility for communities to coordinate with local partners and agencies
• CODI acts as facilitator
• It enables the changes to community social structures
• Helps to trigger acceptance of the low-income communities once changes have been implemented
• Secure land tenure negotiated for most communities by individuals with emphasis on collective rather than individual land tenure

So far 1,250 community initiatives are in operation, 76,792 households have been improved and the program is working in 237 cities in Thailand.

Interesting quotes:

“As a result of settlement upgrading, the issue of land tenure has been resolved, shacks and makeshifts are replaced by permanent housing and necessary utilities and basic services are put in place” (p24).

“Secure land tenure is essential in allowing this development to happen and opens up the gate for additional energy, development resources and investment to flow into these communities” (ibid).

“Property rights bring with them a sense of legitimacy, infrastructure improvements, while creating a much-needed capital, and the participation of the poor” (p25).

Conclusion

The general impacts on UPCD:

• Increase in community organisation and networks
• Increase in community assets and direct financial resources
• Increased community management and entrepreneurship skills
• Development of more diverse housing solutions from individual projects to city processes
• Development of large scale community welfare activities
• Communities have stronger status and can develop better partnerships with local authorities and other development actors
• Changing the way how development institutions are managed

Case Study: Ruam Samakee Community

Squatter community comprising 124 families on 0.89ha of swamp land in the Ramkhamhaeng Soi 39 in Bangkok owned by the Crown Property Bureau (CPB). The community comprised of migrants from north-eastern Thailand such as vendors in unregulated factories and labourers from the Ramkhamhaeng business area.

CPB initially wanted to lease the land to a private developer with the permission to evict the occupants. However the Ruam Samakee Community organised themselves into savings groups and set up a welfare program and through lengthy negotiation processes managed to obtain a long-term lease of the land, returning 0.16ha of land and rebuilding houses on the remaining 0.73ha plot on a collective long-term lease.

After the initiation of the Baan Mankong Program, the Ruam Samakee Community was selected as one of the pilot projects. Two young architects from the Community Organisation Development Office “began working with the people to help develop a new layout plan, with three lines of row-houses arranged along two lanes, a small community center and a playground” (p28).

The upgrading program comprised creation of new housing (detached-twin houses, row houses and flats for rent), land and tenure status, management of housing construction costs, creation of housing standards, provision of basic services and enabling the housing to be affordable. By 2008 all 124 units had been constructed, with a raised level of land to prevent flooding and new infrastructure. These pilot projects influenced the initiation of development projects of seven other informal settlements on CPB land in the area.

The financial sustainability of the program can be observed through three indicators; community savings activity, community investment in their housing and social contract binding the community together.

Actors:

CODI (Community Organisations Development Institute), Rural Development Fund, UCDO (Urban Community Development Office), Crown Property Bureau (CPB), DANCED (Danish Cooperation for Environment and Development), the Duang Prateep Foundation, Human Development Center, Human Settlement Federation, NESDB (National Economic and Social Development Board), NHA (National Housing Authority), POFD (People’s Organisation for Development), UNESCAP (United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific), Urban Community Development Committees, Thai Government, Municipalities, Local Authorities, NGOs, Federations, Professionals, Savings Groups, Community Networks, Local Academics/Universities, Ruam Samakee Community

Housing, the state and the market in Thailand: Enabling and enriching the private sector

Yap Kioe Sheng

Journal of Housing and the Built Environment 17: 33-47,2002.

Housing is not viewed as a high priority on the political agenda in Thailand.  The exception being between 1970’s and 1980’s  when NHA built low cost rental apartments.  During this period the government facilitated private sector housing development by allowing them to build at a low cost and intervened to keep interest rates low to encourage more people to buy property.

The lack of integrated housing policies by successive governments produced mixed results in terms of adequate housing for low income groups.  The paper focuses on the Bangkok Metropolitan Region (BMR) as this  is the largest and economically vital area in Thailand.

Bangkok Metropolitan Region is comprised of the Bangkok Metropolitan Area (BMA) and five provinces, Nakhon Pathom, Nonthaburi, Pathum Thani, Samut Prakan and Samut Sakhon.  The population of the area varies due to the overspill from BMA into surrounding provinces which are highly urbanised and rural areas.  Furthermore many of the residents of BMR officially live in other regions as they have not transferred their housing registration to BMK.  From 1980 to 2000 the population growth has been estimated at 3 million, starting at 7 million in 1980 to 10 million in 2000.

There has been a steady increase of housing units in the BMR, from 1980 0.97 million units to 2.65 units by 2000.  The paper describes 3 main stages of housing production in BMR over a 2 decade period.

1 From 1980 to  1985 – Slow growth in housing stock averaging 3% per annum. This equates to an increase of 29,357 units

2 From 1986 to 1996 – Rapid growth in housing stock averaging 10.6% per annum. This equates to an increase of 120,978 units

3 From 1997 to 2000 – Slow growth due to financial crisis in 1997 averaging 2.3% per annum. This equates to an increase of 83,893        units.

There were a total of 1,677,864 by the end of 2000.  The housing stock tripled over the 20 year period and the population grew by 40% for the same period.  This boom mirrored the economy of Thailand which began in 1986 through until 1997.

The figures for housing production do not include that of informal housing sector.  In 1985 1020 slums and squatter settlements were recorded and the estimated population was around 1.2 million.  These figures have remained fairly constant over time unlike the formal sector. It has been said that the increase in low cost housing production is responsible for reducing the number of slum dwellers.

There was an increase in evictions during the period of economic boom as a result of increased land prices and the demand for land, however firm conclusions cannot be drawn as to whether slum dwellers moved into other informal settlements or onto the formal sector. The effect of the financial crisis of 1997 was of increased urban poverty; many people who became unemployed moved into slum areas, however there are no surveys giving concrete figures for this.

The increase in private sector developer- built housing resulted in a decline in the number of self-built housing in the formal and informal sectors.

In comparison to the housing production by private developers, the state produced very little housing (NHA),  it was given that the state was not required to intervene in housing production as sufficient housing was being provided by the private sector.

The National Housing Authority

The Housing Bureau and the Housing Division (Public Welfare Department), the Community Improvement Office and the Government Housing Bank were responsible for housing up until 1973,  during this period there were very limited housing policies in place.  From 1973 following a period of shortage in housing the above state agencies and the development portion of the Government Housing Bank merged to form the National Housing Authority of  Thailand (NHA).

Responsibilites included:-

Building homes for people

Conducting urban community development to clear slums and resettle those affected from clearing process

Providing dwellings and estates for rent, sale and hire-purchase and management of these properties as well as subsidies to tenants and buyers.

1973 saw the end of  a long period of  military dictatorship.  Successive governments were more liberal and  focused on the social welfare of the population.  Although established under the military regime the NHA carried out most of its planning after the rule ended. This was cut short by a military coup in 1976 and saw a period of military-bureaucratic rule until 1987.

NHA – plans

1974-1983 – plan to construct 170,000 housing units, dependant on govt subsidies.  Plan was cancelled in1978 after 36,868 units were built due to the financial burden on the government.

1976 – 1980 – revised plan reduced target units to 120,000, this was also cancelled  due to reliance on state subsidy

1979-1982 – Accelerated plan, replaced the previous and (influenced by World Bank) focused on improvement of 26,000 slum dwellings and development of 14,400 plots in 2 sites- and – service schemes.

1982-1986 – 5 year plan – could not be realised

1984-1986 – 3 year plan replaced the previous.

Each plan failed due to the lack of funding required or through being rejected by the government.  By the mid 80’s all the NHA direct construction plans were abandoned in favour of slum improvement sites-and-services schemes.

Collaboration with private developers started the construction of middle-income housing construction, the profits were to be used to support low-income housing.

3 main problems faced by the NHA

– Ineffectiveness of  its policy of direct construction – units were small and only accomodated 10% of the 1 million slum dwellers. Many disliked the units despite the inner city location and heavily subsidised rents. Many sold their occupancy rights and returned to slums

– Inability to improve slums and squatter areas – many slums and squatter settlements were located on private land and therefore it was impossible for NHA to implement upgrading programmes on this land.

– Difficulty in securing adequate land – complicated anti-corruption state regulations made it a very arduous process and difficult to compete with private sector for land..

The Government Housing Bank

Established in 1953, given status of state enterprise.  Inexperience led to bad loans and a crisis in the early 80’s.

1982 – the bank was reorganised by the Ministry of Finance, although the bank remained a state enterprise it was able to operate on a commercial basis.  The GHB was able to offer reduced interest rates and force commercial banks to lower their home mortgage loans, creating improved housing affordability in the country.  Demand increased, which in turn allowed private sector developers to produce lower-cost housing and an increase in the development of the housing sector.

The Private Sector

6 Periods of Private Sector  housing development

1957 – 1967 – land developers divided and developed vacant plots and then sold onto middle-income families

1967 -1973 – Housing project developers.  Projects became popular due to availabilty of loans and good economy.  3 types of housing developers; land development companies, professional housing developers, building contractors.

1973-1976 – Decline in housing development.  Governement issued Land Subdivision Act to control developers but standards were high and developers were discouraged from taking on projects. Oil crisis further discouraged developers, house prices plummeted

1976-1979 – Housing development projects increased again

1980-1982 – second oil crisis, increase in interest rates saw decline in housing demand and therefore in  development

Mid 1980’s saw an increasing middle class, the demand for housing grew once again. GHB was able to provide loans to homebuyers and private developers to support the demand.

Developers, politicians and bankers

As the ease with which developers could access loans increased, the number of loans increased and the government urged banks to be more selective in giving out loans for housing development.  However many government ministers were closely connected to commercial banks and the real estate sector and relied on them for financial support and so the ministers were not heavily enforcing strict control.

The repayment of the loans was dependent on the properties being sold and so the real estate developers and commercial banks agreed on a package deal to provide low interest loans to customers purchasing one of their own financed properties. Some banks had their own real estate departments and so they were able to control the entire process from build to sale.  Despite government intervening with stricter controls, the banks were able to continue dealings through their own established finance companies which were not as heavily monitored.

Throughout the early 90’s the demand for housing was kept artificially high, many purchases were speculative.  It was not a sign that people were moving out of slums and into formal housing as first thought.

By the middle of the 90’s there was an apparent oversupply of housing.  GHB found 350,000 vacant housing units in BMR many low cost condominiums.  Many developers were unable to sell their units and so defaulted on their loan repayments.

Urban Community Development Office

Economic growth may have seen many people enter the formal housing market but the financial crisis led many into urban poverty.

In 1992 the government  approved the Urban Poor Development Project with a budget of 50million USD.  The NHA issued a regulation for the establishment of the UCDO to implement the project under its jurisdiction.

The UCDO’s objective “is to strengthen, through credit provision, the capacity of slum dwellers and the urban poor to obtain increased and secure income and appropriate housing with secure rights and an improved environment.

1999 the UCDO and the Rural Development Fund merged to form the Community Organisation Development Institute (CODI).

 

Actors: The State, Private sector developers, National Housing Authority (NHA), Government Housing Bank (GHB),  Bangkok International Banking Facility (BIBF), Bangkok Land, The Ministry of Finance, Bank of Thailand, New Aspiration Party (NAP), Financial Institutions Development Fund (FIDF), Urban Committee Development Office (UCDO), , Housing Policy Sub-committee of the National Economic and Social Development Board, Rural Development fund, Community Organisation Development Insitute (CODI)

Key Words: Developers, housing, policy, poverty, public sector, Thailand, finance, government

UCEA – Urban Community Environmental Activities

Boonyabancha, Somsook. ‘The Urban Community Environmental Activities Project and its Environment Fund in Thailand’, in Environment and Urbanization, Vol. 11, No. 1, April 1999, pp. 101-115.

The article is written before the formation of CODI, when it was called UCDO (Urban Community Development Office). Under that name, Thai Government with the help of Danish[1] Government provided a grant called UCEA (Urban Community Environmental Activities). This article explains how UCEA grant works, the benefits of it and the lessons learned.

The grant is for low-income communities that need to improve environmental conditions in their neighbourhoods; those improvements can be garbage managements, tree plating, landscape recovery, walkways, canal-cleaning…

The amount of  the grant is very low to make big transformations but the intention of the grant is “to stimulate a process of change, to start a chain reaction of developments.” (p.102)

“These small grants support small, concrete improvements but they can show communities that change is possible” (p.102)

The UCEA is driven to empower the community and share the responsibility with local authorities:

–       mutual decision making

–       self-managed development in the communities

–       community participatory process in urban development and environmental management

–       community cooperation with other communities – networks

Descentralization!

“Somsook Boonyabancha is the Managing Director of the Urban Community Environmental Activities Project (UCEA) and the Urban Community Development Office (UCDO), and is also the Secretary-General of the Asian Coalition for Housing Rights (ACHR)”

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[1] DANCED – Danish Cooperation for Environment and Development

“Mode of Production and Spatial Organization in Thailand: Process and Trends”

Bruneau, Michael. “Mode of Production and Spatial Organization in Thailand: Process and Trends”, in Antipode, Volume 14, Issue 1, April 1982, pp. 1–10.

Summary:
In order to analyse how a society deals with spatial organization this article describes the Asiatic and the capitalist mode of production in Thailand as well as their corresponding state structure and administrative network. Significant levels of organization and power are state and village and intermediate regional structures between these 2. It looks in particular at the capitalist mode of production and how it modifies and combines with the previous forms of production. It also looks at the relevance of the regional division of Thailand and a possible different division based on the irregular penetration of the capitalist mode of production.

Asiatic mode of production:

• One of last forms of classless societies in village communities
• Emergence of aristocracy and society of classes which had power of state and received communities product in work and in kind.
• Concentric areas of authority: the king, the Chao, the Nai (patrons), and their supporters the Phrai and the That
• Spatial organization in a structure of a concentric zonal pattern around the capital with three circles, more and more autonomous towards the perimeter
• Three classes of province (depending on the size of its centre) governed by local dynasties with large degree of autonomy
• Autonomous village communities as smallest administrative unit
• Space was not organized and uniform but had pockets of population with undefined boundaries between them
• Control of people more important than control of space

Capitalist mode of production:

• Emergence of bourgeoisie leads to radical modification in 2^nd half of 19^th century
• Reform policies favored merchant capitalism
• Development of communication network, railways and roads led to centralized administration from Bangkok.
• All forms of slavery abolished 1905
• Work and in kind duties became per capita and land tax
• More rational and uniform administrative system based on british colonial model replaced the concentric zonal system
• Division according to precise hierarchical system from province to village.
• Villages also lost their autonomy and older structures broke up due to integration into commercial/money based network and integration village chiefs into centralized administration and coming with this a class struggle within the villages

While regions have become irrelevant, Thailand can be divided into following areas:

• Urban and peri-urban
• Mining areas
• Amall and medium sized plantations
• Mountain tops and slopes
• Basins plains and accessible rice-cultivating Valleys

Suggestion:
Consider different types of penetration of capitalist mode of production in Thai space with different levels of integration. Regions are currently mostly geographical features.

Setting the Context: Thailand (Khan Prachuabmoh, 2005)

Note: This article was published in more than one source.  Amy & I both read it.  I will expand on what Amy has already written.

The paper presents case studies of successful policy-driven housing and housing finance programs that played a significant part in helping Thailand’s economy recover from the 1997 economic crisis.

Rapid population growth and continuous urbanisation have created numberous demands for housing over a wide range of income levels.

Statistics indicated taht in Bangkok alone more than 43,000 households lived in slums and squatters settlements.

The article describes the Baan Mankong – National Slum Upgrading Program.

Through the success of these types of programs, Thai government policy has embraced social as well as economic rationales for creating affordable housing for low and lower-middle income households.  It is supporting these policy measures by creating an environment that stimulates the demand for and supply of housing.  The measures include:

1. Ensuring low-interest-rate environments
2. Developing a reliable Real Estate Information Centre
3. Developing long-term transporation and urban planning strategies
4. Improving Consumer Protection laws for homebuyers
5. Developing an active secondary housing market

Big Housing Challenges / Issues

1. The big housing challenge is building enough appropriate housing for the low and lower-middle income urban poor in Thailand.
2. Developing the infrastructure and legal mechanisms for converting slum and squatters rights into legal rights that satisfy all stakeholders.
3. Developing the secondary home-resale market.

Big Housing Finance Challenges

1. Developing an infrastrucure that will deliver all purchasers the optimal and most appropriate low-cost mortgages available (long-term).  This means continuous innovations and introducing new products that meet the changing needs of a fast-developing young economy.
2. Policy makers must ensure that the country has a financial and legal infrastructure that can rapidly adjust to the quick-changing needs of the financial institutions that deliver mortgages to the country’s home buyers.

Additional Innovative Financing Programs:

1. Micro-Finance Provider – CODI
2. Hire-Purchase Programs
3. Securitization
4. Mortgage Default Insurance

Actors:

National Housing Authority (NHA) – established to provide housing and financial assistance to low and middle-income people.  It was the government’s catalyst to the development of rental accommodations and affordable homes that could be purchased by low and middle-income citizens.  It was also involved in upgrading slum and squatter housing environments.

The Autonomy of Thai Housing Policy, 1945-1996

Giles, Ceinwen. ‘The Autonomy of Thai Housing Policy, 1945-1996’, in Habitat International, Vol. 27, Issue 2, June 2003, pp. 227-244.

The essay explores the interplay between international agencies and national housing policy and the impact of agency recommendations on the evolution of housing programmes. It states that we cannot assume that government actions reflected the endorsements of international agencies in the past.

The article looks at Thailand as a case-study and distinguishes between recommendations and actual housing programs accomplished by governments in order to assess their impact. It also describes a history of international recommendations and actual housing policies in Thailand.

In the case of Thailand (chosen here because typical for development context) he suggests that there is a divergence between the recommendations of international agencies and the local housing practices, e.g. built public housing in 50s to 70s and used slum clearance, resisted aided self-help in 60s and 70s. Conclusion that the barrier to bottom-up solutions was local. Only in the 80s Thai policy joined the market-oriented enabling approach. He suggests that they did so because it justified a hands-off approach of supporting the private sector, that Thailand already favored.

This divergence also means that preferred solutions weren’t necessarily cost-effective. A reason could be that agencies focus on cost-effectiveness while national governments consider more their political visibility and might not support the most economically needy but the ones whose support they need most. This means that national policy responds to international advice if it fits the political agenda. It also means that in order to assess the effectiveness of progammes in the past it effectiveness might not be the right criteria to look at, as it wasn’t necessarily the outlook of Thai politicians.

Bangkok specifically has a housing shortage since the ‘40s, mostly in Bangkok through rural-urban migration and war destructions, rising rents and rising land prices – during this time slums became public concern. A housing division was created in department of public welfare.

The article outlines history growth of slums in Bangkok, still a million are living in slums in 1996.

Bangkok slum settlements have 2 unique features: Only 16 % is illegal, otherwise they are renting squatters and also its distinguished by the geography of canals. These provide strips of land belonging to the irrigation department but also very unsafe/unhealthy conditions because of flooding and constant standing water.